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INTRODUCTION 
Recently, there has been a significant amount of interest in so-
called “social enterprises.”  While there is no precise definition of a 
social enterprise, “[t]he working definition . . . is that a social 
enterprise is one organized and operated for the dual purpose                                          
of engaging in profit-making activity and furthering a social good.”1  
Thus, a social enterprise is thought to occupy a borderland between 
two sectors of society: the business sector and the charitable or social 
sector. 
The social enterprise movement has been accompanied by what 
might best be called a social enterprise legal reform movement.  Legal 
reformers take the position that social enterprises are overly 
constrained by a regulatory environment that puts enterprises in one 
of two boxes: either the enterprise is a for-profit business or it is a non-
profit charity.2  In response to this perceived limitation of current law, 
 
 1  Linda O. Smiddy, Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C & Other Developments in 
Social Entrepreneurship, 35 VT. L. REV. 3, 5 (2010).  See also Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice 
of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 337 (2009) (discussing “so-
called hybrid social enterprises, which combine the soul of nonprofit organizations 
with the discipline and business savvy of for-profits”).  Generally, social enterprises are 
differentiated from businesses who seek to use some (or all) of their profits from one 
activity to advance a separate social good.  See, e.g., Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The 
Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 91–92 (2010) (distinguishing a for-profit social 
enterprise in which commercial activities directly affect mission from an enterprise in 
which commercial activities merely provide a source of revenue to support the 
mission).  For a more functionally limited definition that is arguably more useful, see 
Ofer Eldar, The Role of Social Enterprise and Hybrid Organizations 1 (Yale Law & 
Economics Research Paper No. 485, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2379012 (“The common characteristic of social 
enterprises is that they have a transactional relationship with their beneficiaries.”). 
 2  See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose With Profit: Governance, 
Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 
66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (citing Allen R. Bromberger, Social Enterprise: A Lawyer’s 
Perspective, PERLMAN & PERLMAN LLP, http://www.pearlmanandpearlman.com/ 
publications/articles/2008/socialenterprise.pdf)  (“Even with the help of the most 
experienced attorneys skilled in structuring such arrangements, the lack of a 
convenient legal form, designed to accommodate the dual goals of profit and charity, 
remains the ‘single greatest challenge’ of social enterprises.”). See also Kelley, supra 
note 1 at 340–44 (arguing that social entrepreneurs believe that “outmoded law and 
inappropriate old-style legal entities hamstring their socially transformative plans”); 
Anthony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social Responsibility? 
34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1362 (2011) (“The push for new forms reflects 
dissatisfaction with the seemingly binary nature of existing options.”); Susannah Camic 
Tahk, Crossing the Tax Code’s For-Profit/Nonprofit Border, 118 PENN. STATE L. REV. 489, 
491–92 (2014) (“Tax law patrols the nonprofit border carefully [and the laws] view 
sectorial border-crossings with suspicion.”); Robert A. Wexler, Social Enterprise: A Legal 
Context, 54 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 233, 233 (2006) (“[Social entrepreneurs must] work 
within a tax regime that is sometimes not flexible enough to accommodate these new 
ideas and new methods.”). 
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social enterprise legal reformers seek to create a third “hybrid” legal 
form to facilitate social enterprise.  They seek to create a legal or 
regulatory environment better suited to the dual social and financial 
purposes of social enterprises.  If success can be measured by changes 
to the law, these legal reformers have been surprisingly successful.3  
Many states have enacted laws to provide new business entity 
designations for social enterprises, and such new business-form 
statutes include benefit corporations, L3Cs, flexible purpose 
corporations, benefit LLCs, and others.4 
A significant focus of social enterprise legal reformers is 
“deregulatory,” in the sense that the new business forms are intended 
to free social enterprises from a variety of laws that constrain the 
“traditional” non-profit sector.5  High on the list of legal regimes that 
are perceived to be overly restrictive is the federal law of charities6 
contained in the Internal Revenue Code.7  These federal tax laws 
permit charitable organizations to earn money tax-free and to receive 
tax-deductible contributions.8  These benefits are accompanied by a 
list of restrictions.9  Prominent among the restrictions is the 
requirement that tax-exempt charitable organizations operate as non-
profits.  That is, under the so-called “no inurement” rule, tax-exempt 
organizations are prohibited from distributing any net earnings or 
other “excess benefit” to shareholders or any other person who is in a 
position to control the organization (so-called “disqualified 
persons”).10  This no-inurement rule does not prevent tax-exempt 
 
 3  See Brian Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs It?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 2025, 2025 (2013) 
(“Social enterprise lawmaking is a growth industry.”).  As Robert T. Esposito has 
pointed out, “These entities have consistently received bipartisan political support.”  
Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on Emerging 
Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the Benefit Corporation, 4 
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 648 (2013). 
 4  Anne Field, Benefit Corporations, L3Cs and All the Rest: Making Sense of Those 
Confusing Choices, FORBES (May 25, 2012, 9:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
annefield/2012/05/25/benefit-corporations-l3cs-and-all-the-rest-making-sense-of-
those-confusing-choices/. 
 5  See Wexler, supra note 2, at 233 (“This article is a call to action to the exempt 
organization legal community to help . . . change the law to accommodate new 
approaches to philanthropy.”). 
 6  This Article is primarily concerned with organizations described in Section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which I generally refer to as “charities.” 
 7  Social enterprise legal reformers sometimes argue that the new laws are 
necessary to avoid state corporate law as well, although many commentators point out 
that this concern is probably exaggerated. 
 8  See I.R.C. §§ 501(a), 501(c)(3), & 170 . 
 9  See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 10  See discussion infra at Section II(A). 
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charities from engaging in income-generating activities, or even from 
making substantial profits year after year.  But it does prevent them 
from having owners who share in those profits, and social enterprise 
legal reformers point out that this prohibition can make it difficult to 
raise sufficient capital to engage in some socially beneficial activities, 
especially if a social enterprise has the potential to both make money 
and do good.11 
The new social enterprise legal forms take two very different 
approaches to the “deregulatory” goals.  Some, like Benefit 
Corporations, seek to completely avoid federal charity law.  Benefit 
Corporations do not expect to have donors making tax-deductible 
contributions to them and they do not generally seek money from 
organizations that have received such contributions.  Instead, they 
hope to find investors who are willing to accept a potentially lower 
financial return in order to advance a social purpose.12  As long as they 
do not take any money from tax-exempt charities, the federal law of 
charities does not apply to them, and they have accomplished the 
deregulatory impulse.  From the perspective of federal tax law, they are 
exactly the same as any other for-profit corporate entity. 
Other social enterprise legal forms do not completely avoid the 
federal law of charities because they seek to combine charitable funds 
with profit-driven investors.  The most notable of these new forms is 
the L3C, but lawyers have been experimenting for years with 
mechanisms for combining charitable and for-profit funds in “hybrid” 
business entities that make use of separate “tranches” of business and 
 
 11  See Cassady V. Brewer, A Novel Approach to Using LLCs for Quasi-Charitable 
Endeavors (A/K/A “Social Enterprise”), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 678, 685 (2012) 
(“Desperately in need of capital, a social entrepreneur therefore dreams about a legal 
vehicle that not only allows private ownership and investment, but one that also may 
receive private foundation grants and charitable contributions.  Currently, there is no 
such legal entity.”).  In Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. 
L. REV. 337, 354 (2009), Thomas Kelley writes: 
Social entrepreneurs’ difficulty raising start-up or expansion capital has 
driven many away from the nonprofit sector, but their capitalization 
problems are not entirely solved by choosing to launch as for-profit 
ventures.  As an initial matter, for-profit social entrepreneurs generally 
cut themselves off from the sources that traditionally have funded 
socially beneficial activities—private foundations and governments. 
See also Murray & Hwang, supra note 2, at 17 (“The obstacle in raising capital is 
sometimes said to be the most significant challenge for social entrepreneurs who turn 
to existing for-profit forms.”); Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual 
Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105, 106 (2010) (“‘[C]haritable forms’ limited funding 
streams—from donations, debt-financing, and earned revenue—are precisely what 
have turned the interest of many social entrepreneurs to blended enterprise.”). 
 12  See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, 
and Benefit Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
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social investors.  In this article, I call these hybrid entities “tranched 
social enterprises” whether they are L3Cs, LLCs, partnerships, or even 
simple contractual joint venture arrangements.13  Because these 
business forms seek to use charitable funds, they do not avoid the law 
that applies to tax-exempt charities.  Social enterprise legal reformers 
focusing on “hybrid” entities, like the L3C, pursue the deregulatory 
goal by seeking to change the law to make hybrids more accessible, but 
they do not generally explicitly argue that the law should be changed 
to free such entities from the no-inurement rule.14  The point of these 
organizations is that they are permitted to have investors who receive 
the profits from the enterprise’s activities, but to the degree to which 
they have charitable donors or investors, the law of private inurement 
still applies to those charities, creating potential restrictions on the 
enterprise’s use of the charity’s money. 
But there is a problem with the scholarship on all of these new 
social enterprise business forms.  It tends to treat the deregulatory 
impulse as primarily an attempt to clear away unnecessary confusion 
in the law.  This scholarship often acknowledges that the no-inurement 
rule is important to prevent diversion of funds intended for social 
purposes into the pockets of investors or other stakeholders.15  But no 
 
 13  Christopher C. Archer, Comment, Private Benefit for the Public Good: Promoting 
Foundation Investment in the ‘Fourth Sector’ to Provide More Efficient and Effective Social 
Missions, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 159, 160–61 (2011) (“[T]he L3C blueprint uses a PRI to 
leverage a market return for profit-seeking investors in a tranched, that is, multi-
layered, investment strategy.”); Thomas Kelley, supra note 1, at 373–74 (describing a 
“tiered investment strategy” with three “tiered investment tranches” including a “social 
outcomes” tier that would not receive any significant financial return, an “intermediate 
tier” that would provide a lower-than-market return, and a “market-rate tier” that 
would “attract capital from private-sector investors such as venture capitalists and 
financial institutions”); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social 
Enterprise, 66 STAN. L. REV. 387, 418–19 (2014) (“L3C advocates promote L3Cs as being 
particularly amenable to a tranched finance structure whereby private foundations 
make high-risk, low-return PRI infusions into the L3C, thereby attracting socially 
minded and traditional market members who make lower-risk and higher-return 
investments.”); Katz & Page, supra note 2, at 1363–64 (describing three tranches: a 
“program-related” tranche that would “ideally take the riskiest position in the capital 
structure and receive no or lower returns,” a “mezzanine” tranche “designed for 
investors willing to accept a lower return because of their contribution to social 
welfare,” and a “top tranche” that “might be at the risk-adjusted market rate of 
return”). 
 14  See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 2, at 244 (“Ultimately, though, the hybrid entity that 
[a hypothetical social entrepreneur] dreams about, an entity that could receive grants 
and also have investors, does not exist under U.S. law.”). 
 15  See, e.g., Archer, supra note 13, at 161 (“One of the primary issues in using this 
strategy is whether a foundation’s participation in the L3C’s tranched investment 
structure violates fundamental rules regarding nonprofit operations, thereby 
threatening the foundation’s exempt status.”); Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC 
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scholarly article to date has systematically addressed the application of 
the no inurement rule in the social enterprise context.16  This problem 
is exacerbated by the fact that there is a surprising lack of certainty 
about how this most basic principle of the federal law of charities—the 
no inurement rule—applies to tranched social enterprises. 
This Article provides the first detailed examination of the impact 
of the no-inurement regime in the context of tranched social 
enterprises.17  It argues that the no inurement regime should absolutely 
prohibit people who are so-called “disqualified persons” from profiting 
from investments in social enterprises if the charity they control is a 
donor or investor.  This reading of the no inurement rule is justified 
for the same reasons it is justified in the charitable context: because 
the interests of “independent” decision-makers are better aligned with 
the charitable or social goals of an organization—goals which are 
supported by donors to charitable organizations and the government 
who has provided tax subsidies to support these goals.  A tranched 
 
(L3C): Program-Related Investment by Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 245 (2010) 
(“Of course, no matter how PRI status is achieved, that status does not sanction private 
inurement”); Id. at 265 (“The tranche-investment notion potentially violates the 
private-inurement restriction.”); J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: 
Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private 
Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273 (2010); Daniel S. 
Kleinberger & J. William Callison, When the Law is Understood—L3C No 3 (William 
Mitchell C.L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2010-07, 2010) 
(“Tranched investing runs the risk of exporting these privileges to benefit non-
charitable businesses, managers, and investors.”); Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth 
Deconstructed: The ‘Emperor’s New Clothes’ on the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 879 (2010); Murray & Hwang, supra note 2, at 50 (“We believe, 
however, that . . . the IRS will not look favorably on this type of arrangement.”); Dana 
Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with FLY Paper: A Hybrid Financial 
Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1495, 1524 (2013) (“[S]ocial investors 
need assurances that their willingness to sacrifice financial returns will not merely 
provide a windfall to entrepreneurs.”); Wexler, supra note 2, at 244 (“To be credible, 
those entities would have to contain strict prohibitions on any excess benefits to 
insiders.”). 
 16  The most extensive scholarly treatments to date are Archer, supra note 13; and 
Brewer, supra note 11, at 697–706. 
 17  There are also state law doctrines that affect tranched social enterprises, such 
as the state law duty of loyalty.  See Ellen Aprill, Reconciling Nonprofit Self-Dealing Rules, 
Volume 48 A.B.A. REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L. J., (forthcoming Winter 2014) (manuscript 
at 5) (“The challenge of ensuring that nonprofit officers and directors (or trustees) 
do not violate their duty of loyalty, including by engaging in self-dealing, represents a 
key problem of nonprofit organizations.”).  Although, “the duty of loyalty owed by 
trustees of charitable trusts and directors of charitable corporations under state law is 
now largely eclipsed by federal tax laws that effectively regulate fiduciary behavior.”  
Johnny Rex Buckles, The Federalization of the Duty of Loyalty Governing Charity Fiduciaries 
under United States Tax Law, 99 KY. L. J. 645, 646 (2011).  This Article addresses only 
the federal law of charities. 
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social enterprise should not be permitted to avoid the no inurement 
regime simply because it has moved those funds one step away from 
the direct control of the charity that collected them.  This may seem 
like an excessively modest proposal, but it is by no means the consensus 
view among social enterprise legal reformers. 
There is an additional benefit to clarifying the meaning of the no-
inurement regime in the tranched social enterprise context.  The 
social enterprise legal reform movement arguably has not only 
“deregulatory” goals, but also “regulatory” ones.  In order to be 
successful, social enterprises need to make credible claims to various 
stakeholders—investors, customers, workers and others—that they are 
really different from ordinary businesses . . . that they are really 
pursuing their social goals.18  The new legal forms seek to provide 
various stakeholders with credible means of detecting and enforcing 
the particular balance of social and financial good that the enterprise 
will pursue.  So, for example, benefit corporation statutes generally 
require benefit corporations to have their social impact measured 
against some third-party standard and they may give certain 
stakeholders the right to sue the corporation for failing to pursue its 
social goals or for failing to balance social with financial goals.  This 
“regulatory” impulse seeks to provide new legal mechanisms to 
adjudicate between competing visions of the proper balance between 
social and financial goals. 
This Article argues that the federal law of charities provides 
another mechanism to assist social enterprises to make credible 
commitments to their stakeholders about the balance of social and 
financial goals.  It is not an argument that starting fresh with new 
mechanisms, as we are doing with benefit corporations, is a bad idea.  
But it is an argument that—at least with respect to the core concerns 
of the law of charities, which is preventing misappropriation of 
charitable funds—the extension of charity law to social enterprises 
provides a better solution, even for “mixed-purpose” investors.  In 
other words, even if one wants to make a financial investment in a 
social enterprise rather than a charitable contribution, he would be 
better off investing in a tranched social enterprise under a clarified 
extension of the no-inurement regime than he would be in a social 
enterprise that avoided the law of charities entirely.  That is because 
an independent charitable tranche provides the best oversight of a for-
 
 18  See, e.g., Eldar, supra note 1, at 20–21 (“Standard economic theory is very 
suspicious of subsidizing corporations.  There is a general concern that subsidies fail 
to achieve their purpose and may be expropriated by those who control the 
organization.”). 
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profit enterprise, and any individual investor or donor can free-ride on 
the decisions independent charities make about how to structure their 
sharing of power. 
Finally, however, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge that 
there is a lot of uncertainty in the law of charities that is not justified 
by the desire to prevent the diversion of charitable funds away from 
their proper purposes.  Thus, social enterprise legal reformers are by 
no means wrong when they call for simplification of the law to facilitate 
social entrepreneurship.  For example, the law of private benefit—
often confused or conflated with the law of private inurement19—is very 
poorly defined and arguably is a significant barrier to tranched social 
enterprises, even when these enterprises observe the inurement laws.  
The law of charitable “joint ventures” is unclear and creates 
impediments to social enterprises that are arguably not fully justified 
by concerns about diversion of charitable dollars.  The law of private 
foundations’ program-related investments is complicated and 
uncertain as well, again inhibiting social enterprises without a clear 
justification.  Thus, while this Article defends the clear extension of the 
law of inurement to the social enterprise context in a restrictive way, it 
also argues that these other doctrines should be clarified and 
potentially liberalized.  That is because they arguably prevent tranched 
social enterprises from employing the full range of possible 
commitment devices and thus are overly restrictive.20 
This Article proceeds in four sections.  First, it describes 
“tranched” social enterprises and the “subsidy problem” that they 
create.  Second, it describes the “private inurement regime” and 
applies it in the tranched social enterprise context.  Third, it argue that 
the best interpretation of the private inurement regime is a simple rule 
prohibiting investing by persons who are disqualified persons with 
respect to any charitable investor. This section uses the so-called 
“agency theory” to argue that the no-inurement rule is fully justified 
when charitable funds are being used.  But it also argues that tranched 
social investments have benefits for social investors even when they are 
investing with funds that carry no tax benefit.  For these investors—the 
same people who may be tempted to invest in business forms that avoid 
the federal law of tax-exempt organizations altogether—a tranched 
investment structure is better because it enables them to free-ride on 
 
 19  See Nicholas A. Mirkay, Relinquish Control! Why the IRS Should Change its Stance on 
Exempt Organizations in Ancillary Joint Ventures, 6 NEV. L.J. 21, 29 (2006) (“These 
doctrines are often incorrectly used interchangeably.”). 
 20  For a discussion of the range of commitment devices used by non-profits to bind 
social enterprises to their social missions, see Eldar, supra note 1, at 41–47. 
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the monitoring and enforcing efforts of the controllers of the 
charitable tranche.  Finally, it briefly describes the aspects of the 
federal law of charities that are not as well justified as the inurement 
rule, and makes some modest proposals about how they could be 
clarified and liberalized. 
I.   INTRODUCTION TO TRANCHED INVESTING 
Imagine that you are a social entrepreneur.  That is, you want to 
further a social good, and are willing to think creatively about how to 
do it.21  Previously, while working in Mozambique, you discovered that 
poor people in poor countries cook primarily on charcoal cookstoves.  
Cooking on charcoal cookstoves is bad for poor people because these 
cookstoves are unhealthy and unsafe.22  In addition, cooking on 
charcoal cookstoves is bad for the environment because burning 
charcoal produces CO2 and other pollutants and because charcoal is 
made from wood, which is harvested from local forests.  Cutting down 
trees to make charcoal produces deforestation, which speeds global 
warming. 
Instead of using charcoal-burning cookstoves, poor people could 
use cleaner-burning, safer, non-deforesting ethanol-burning 
cookstoves.  In your opinion, a sweeping shift from charcoal to ethanol 
would help the environment and improve the lives of poor people 
simultaneously—a win-win.  But ethanol cookstoves are more 
expensive than charcoal cookstoves, even though ethanol is unlikely to 
be more costly than charcoal. 
Because an ethanol revolution would have both distributive 
effects (helping poor people) and produce global public goods 
(reducing CO2 emissions), it is the kind of thing that philanthropists 
may well be interested in.  Because the existence of an ethanol market 
where none previously existed has the potential to make someone a lot 
of money, it is the kind of thing capitalists may well be interested in.23  
 
 21  See Katz & Page, supra note 1, at 59 (defining a “social entrepreneur” as “an 
ambitious person who seeks social change on a large scale, characteristically through 
earned income strategies”). 
 22  See, e.g., John M. Broder, Developing Nations to Get Cleaner Burning Stoves, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/21/science/earth/ 
21stove.html (“Every year, according to the United Nations, smoke from these stoves 
kills 1.9 million people, mostly women and children, from lung and heart diseases and 
low birth weight.”). 
 23  An estimated 800 million people cook with charcoal in Africa alone and ethanol 
can be produced cheaply.  See Brian Merchant, Charcoal Kills 2 Million People & Vast 
Swaths of Forest Every Year.  Brian Merchant, Can Biofuel Stop the Carnage?, TREEHUGGER 
(May 16, 2012), www.treehugger.com/renewable-energy/africa-cooking-charcoal-
kills-millions.html (“Some 80% of Africans still rely on solid-based fuels like wood, 
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And, in fact, philanthropists and capitalists may be mutually 
interdependent on each other for success in reaching their respective 
goals.  Without the philanthropists providing some sort of subsidy for 
the purchase of cookstoves, the ethanol cookstove revolution might 
not get off the ground.  But without a stable supply of ethanol, it will 
not be sustainable.  Without a subsidy, poor women in Mozambique 
will continue to cook with charcoal; without a reliable market, you may 
well find them cooking with charcoal on the fancy ethanol stoves some 
charity gave them—another failed development project. 
Being an entrepreneurial type, you create the Ethanol Cookstove 
for Poor People Project (the “Cookstove Project” or “the Project”) to 
catalyze the social change that you think will benefit both poor people 
and the environment.  The Cookstove Project must raise “charitable” 
funds to subsidize the production or acquisition of ethanol cookstoves.  
But it also must ensure that sufficient funds can be raised to capitalize 
the creation of a stable ethanol supply market, and so the Cookstove 
Project may also want to raise for-profit investment funds.  Thus, the 
Cookstove Project is a sort of “hybrid” that seeks to use both the power 
of capitalists and philanthropists (and, possibly, mixtures of the two) 
to advance the social good.  Capitalists, philanthropists and mixtures 
each require a different bundle of rights and expectations for their 
respective investments, and so the Cookstove Project needs to 
accommodate multiple investment “tranches.” 
How should you organize the Cookstove Project, and what 
restrictions might you encounter if you organize it as a tranched social 
enterprise? 
----------------------------------------------------- 
 
A.  At Least Two Purposes: Social and Financial  
As described above, the Cookstove Project has potentially at least 
two distinct types of benefits: (i) on the one hand, it has “social” 
benefits, since it has the potential to increase health among poor 
people and slow global warming; (ii) on the other hand it has 
“financial” benefits because it has the potential to make money for 
investors in an ethanol supply chain.  It also has at least two challenges 
to meeting its objectives: (i) cookstoves are too expensive for poor 
people to buy without some kind of subsidy; and (ii) creating a reliable 
regional ethanol supply chain is a large and capital-intensive 
enterprise.  Thus, the Cookstove Project has to find funds for two 
 
dung, and especially charcoal for cooking.”). 
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activities: providing subsidized stoves to poor people and creating and 
operating an ethanol supply chain.  Both challenges have to be met for 
either benefit to accrue, and both benefits accrue once the two 
challenges have been met. 
One could imagine a situation in which the potential financial 
benefit is sufficiently large and certain that it would justify the 
provision of the subsidy by investors, even if those investors were 
merely seeking a financial return.  In other words, you could imagine 
an investor thinking to herself, “Let’s give away ethanol cookstoves for 
free instead of charging what they cost to make; we can make up these 
initial losses through ethanol sales later on.”  It is not uncommon when 
businesses seek to build a customer base for them to give something 
away for free.  This phenomenon is so familiar to us in the twenty-first 
century that some have predicted that it will become the dominant 
business model.24  If the probability of profit is certain enough to justify 
the initial investment, then the project can proceed in a traditional, 
for-profit structure.  Social benefits will accrue as an extra benefit from 
the investors seeking a financial return. 
One could also imagine a situation in which the social goals are 
so compelling that a non-profit charity could raise sufficient capital 
from donors to fully fund the Cookstove Project.  In that case, donors 
would provide not just the money to buy free cookstoves for poor 
people, but also sufficient capital to get the ethanol supply chain up 
and running.  The non-profit charity that was created to operate the 
Project would then receive all of the profits from the provision of 
ethanol and it could use that money to expand its operations to other 
parts of the world, or to make ethanol cheaper, or to research other 
ways to benefit the health of poor people or reduce carbon emissions.  
There might be some limitations on the organization to make sure that 
the operation of this profitable business does not violate any laws,25 but 
these challenges are really quite manageable, especially if the non-
profit charity is willing to pay taxes on the income it makes from its 
ethanol business.26 
 
 24  See CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: HOW TODAY’S SMARTEST BUSINESSES PROFIT BY GIVING 
SOMETHING FOR NOTHING (2010).  But, obviously, the sales strategy of giving away 
something for free or selling it below cost in the hope of inducing profitable 
transactions on other products—generally called a “loss leader”—was common before 
the 21st Century. 
 25  Among other things, the so-called “commerciality doctrine” may constrain 
some of the ways the organization conducts its business.  See generally BRUCE HOPKINS, 
THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS §§ 4.7, 4.11 (10th ed. 2011) (discussing the 
Commensurate Test and Commerciality Doctrine respectively). 
 26  Tax-exempt organizations pay tax on income from an “unrelated trade or 
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Finally, one could imagine a world in which two completely 
separate entities engage in the two distinct activities.  A charitable non-
profit solicits donations to subsidize the purchase of ethanol stoves or 
give them away.  Simultaneously, a commercial for-profit business 
raises the investment capital to create and operate an ethanol supply 
business.  There is no legal impediment to these two entities each 
pursuing its own distinct purpose, each making use of its own distinct 
source of funding.27 
But, if one could imagine a world like the three described above, 
it is at least as easy to imagine a world that is not like those three.  For 
example, for an investor seeking a purely financial return, the 
predicted return from the distribution of ethanol might not be large 
enough, or assured enough, to justify an initial investment in giving 
away free ethanol cookstoves.  For a charity, the potential social benefit 
of helping people cook on cleaner, more environmentally friendly 
stoves might not be compelling enough to convince enough donors to 
give enough money to both give away free stoves and build and operate 
an ethanol supply chain.  That is a lot of upfront costs for a social 
benefit that is hard to measure and might not be as beneficial as it 
initially seems.  Finally, there might be good reasons not to pursue the 
Cookstove Project through two distinct unrelated entities.  The 
organizations might want to coordinate with each other, since each 
one’s success is dependent on the other.  From the charity’s 
perspective, some choices the ethanol distributor might make may be 
extremely relevant to its social mission.  For example, it turns out that 
the environmental benefits of ethanol are greatly diminished if 
farmers clear-cut forests to provide land to grow the crop that is 
distilled into ethanol.28  The charity may want to influence the ethanol 
supplier’s policies to ensure that deforestation does not occur, and the 
only way to do so may be to have some sort of ongoing control over, or 
influence on, the ethanol supplier.  From the ethanol supplier’s 
perspective, some choices of the charity may be extremely relevant.  It 
may be that a myriad of business considerations go into the question 
of where it is feasible to distribute ethanol cost effectively, and so the 
ethanol supplier may want to influence where free stoves are 
distributed (and when, and how quickly, and with what instructions, 
 
business” under I.R.C. §§ 511–14. 
 27  See, e.g., ROBERT J. DESIDERIO, PLANNING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS §12.02[4] 
(2009). 
 28  See, e.g., Sabrina Valle, Losing Forests to Fuel Cars, WASH. POST (July 31, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/07/30/AR20070730
01484.html 
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etc.). 
B.  Blending Different Types of Capital 
The Cookstove Project is an example of a social enterprise that 
seeks initial funding from at least two sources.  First, because it is 
conceived as a way to improve the lives of very poor people while 
simultaneously slowing global warming, it is hoping to find donors who 
want to support it for altruistic purposes.  Let us call the funds received 
by the Cookstove Project from these sources “charitable funds.”  It is 
worth pointing out that these funds may come from several sources.  
They may be from altruistic individuals who want to improve the world.  
They may come from existing charitable entities with environmental 
or sustainable-development missions.  These existing charitable 
entities may be so-called “private foundations” or they may be so-called 
“public charities.”29  Funds may come from business corporations 
seeking to be, or appear, responsible or philanthropic.  Funds may 
even come from governments seeking to advance environmental or 
sustainable-development goals. 
In their purest form, charitable funds would come as “donations” 
or “grants,” in which the contributing person parts with his money and 
does not expect any sort of financial remuneration.  In this case, the 
only return received by the contributing person is the amelioration of 
poverty or illness and the benefits to the environment.30  If the funds 
were contributions from individuals or businesses, the donors may 
receive a tax deduction for making the contribution.  If they come 
from charities, the donors to the charity may have received a tax 
deduction when they made the contribution to the donor charity.  If 
they came from a government, there was no tax deduction because 
governments do not pay taxes.  But, in any case, charitable funds are 
funds that are provided at least potentially under circumstances in which 
a donor could have received a government subsidy in the form of a 
charitable contribution deduction.31 
 
 29  A “private foundation” is a subcategory of 501(c)(3) organizations to which 
some greater legal restrictions apply.  See I.R.C. §§ 509, 4940–46. 
 30  Of course, there may be many personal non-financial benefits of donating to 
charity.  These are sometimes collectively called “warm glow,” although they may 
include status, building goodwill, developing personal alliances or connections, and 
others.  See, e.g., Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1222 (2010). 
 31  It is not entirely uncontroversial to describe the tax provisions related to 
charities as “subsidies,” but, it has become the norm to do so.  See, e.g., Miranda Perry 
Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and The Charitable Tax Subsidies, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601, 
608–09 (2011) (“Although a few scholars believe that exemption and deductibility are 
necessary for measurement reasons, the more accepted view is that these provisions 
serve as subsidies that contribute to the size and success of the charitable sector.”). 
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Second, because the Cookstove Project has the potential to 
generate revenue, and even substantial profits, it hopes to find 
investors who are motivated by the promise of financial returns on 
their investment.  Again, these funds may come from a variety of 
sources.  They may come from individuals, or investment funds, or 
businesses, or even charitable organizations or governments.  All these 
sources use financial investments to make money that they use to 
advance their interests.  To the degree to which the motivation of these 
sources is to make money, they may want to make as much money as 
they could with investments of comparable risk profiles available in the 
market generally.  In other words, if these sources are seeking a “pure” 
investment, they are seeking a financial return that is the same or 
greater than the return they could expect to receive from other 
investments made with no specific charitable purpose.  Let us call 
funds received in which a contributing person seeks a return equal to 
the return she could receive on any other investment “market-rate 
investment funds.” 
But, of course, people and institutions do not always have purely 
charitable or purely financial motives.  Sometimes their motives are 
mixed.  Funds may come from people or institutions primarily seeking 
to advance the social purpose of the organization, but with some desire 
for a financial return as well.32  Or, funds may come from people or 
institutions primarily seeking a financial return, but who care very 
deeply about the social purpose of the organization.  Thus, charitable 
funds may come in an impure form, in which the donor seeks to 
receive some kind of financial return, and investment funds may come 
in an impure form in which an investor seeks to ensure some social 
good along with her financial return.  The impure form of both of the 
categories described above is funds provided with some expectation of 
financial return, but not an expectation that the return will be as high 
as could be obtained in the market generally.33  Let us call this third 
 
 32  What is true for people who contribute capital to a social enterprise is also true 
for the founders, managers, and employees who provide labor to the enterprise.  Those 
who provide labor may do so wholly for charitable reasons (in which case they are 
probably “volunteers”), wholly for financial reasons (in which case they presumably 
seek the highest compensation they can obtain), or for some mixed charitable and 
financial reasons (in which case they may accept “below-market” compensation in 
exchange for their services.  This issue is treated in some depth in Benjamin M. Leff, 
The Case Against For-Profit Charity, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 819 (2012), in which I argue 
that there is a range of possible compensation structures, and people often 
misunderstand how much is permitted in non-profit organizations. 
 33  Much of the literature on social enterprise is premised on the idea that many 
investors are seeking both a financial and a social return.  The existence of a market 
for socially responsible investments estimated at 3.3 trillion dollars suggests that 
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category “below-market investment funds.”34  Again, these funds may 
come from a variety of sources, as people or institutions may have 
numerous reasons for wanting some financial return even if their 
motives are largely altruistic, and they may have numerous reasons to 
demand a social return even if their motives are largely profit-
oriented.35 
Given the fact that many investors have mixed motives when 
investing in a social enterprise, it is worth thinking of investors as 
existing along a spectrum.  The farthest left pole represents purely 
charitable capital.  The farthest right pole represents purely profit-
driven capital.  Many investors in social enterprises fall somewhere 
between the two poles, and those investors are potentially willing to 
accept a below-market return on their investments. 
A significant portion of the innovation among legal reformers is 
to provide a legal entity that accommodates these below-market 
investors.  For example, the “benefit corporation” statutes are designed 
to free corporate directors from a duty to maximize profits for their 
shareholders while providing some mechanism for investors to 
monitor some aspects of the social benefit of the corporation.  But 
entities like the benefit corporation are designed for social enterprises 
with a single class of investors.  The problems benefit corporations 
attempt to solve are those associated with a dual mission, not those 
associated with two or more actual classes of investors with different 
 
investors are not solely concerned with financial returns.  See U.S.S.I.F. FOUNDATION, 
REPORT ON SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2012), available at http://www.ussif.org/files/Publications/12_Trends_Exec_ 
Summary.pdf. 
 34  Among other things, some argue that seeking a financial return may be one 
strategy used to hold social enterprises accountable to their funders.  See, e.g., 
MATTHEW BISHOP & MICHAEL GREEN, PHILANTHROCAPITALISM: HOW THE RICH CAN SAVE 
THE WORLD (2008).  For a thoughtful critique of the rhetoric of philanthrocapitalism, 
see Garry W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753 
(2011). 
 35  When funds are provided in a “mixed” form, the question of whether the 
investor has received any sort of charitable subsidy from the government depends on 
the charitable status of the investor.  Thus, if you yourself are not a charity, the only 
way to get a tax deduction for contributing funds that provide a financial return to the 
investor is to donate them to a charity, and then have the charity receive the return on 
the investment.  Some commentators think this structure of the subsidy is either 
inefficient or unfair.  See Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 
93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2065 (2007); M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate 
Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 607 (2009); Gautam 
Jagannath, Using Nonprofits to Serve Charitable Goals of Social Businesses in the United States: 
Circumventing the Lack of Recognition of the Social Business Model in the Federal Tax Code, 32 
PACE L. REV. 239, 242 (2012) (“[I]f social business truly act charitably then they should 
be conferred some tax advantages as well.”). 
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interests.36 
If you seek to accommodate at least two classes of investors who 
lie in different places along the charitable-to-market spectrum, then 
you need different “tranches” of investments.  You need the possibility 
for your investors to receive different returns on their investments.  For 
simplicity’s sake, in this Article, we will assume that there are two 
tranches.  The charitable tranche is closer to the charitable pole, 
although it does not need to be “purely” charitable, and we will in fact 
assume that it is not purely charitable;37 the market tranche is closer to 
the profit-driven pole, even though its investors need not be “purely” 
market driven.  Ideally, the Cookstove Project would find a form of 
organization that could tailor its investment options to investors at very 
different places on the charitable-to-market-rate scale.  That is what a 
tranched investment strategy seeks to do.  It seeks to provide different 
investment options for investors who value social return and financial 
return differently.  Because the Cookstove Project has strong appeal to 
philanthropists and strong appeal to capitalists, it seeks to provide a 
mechanism by which philanthropists can invest in it in exchange for a 
lower return and capitalists in exchange for a higher return so the 
Project can access both sources of capital. 
Thus, a “tranched investment strategy” is necessary if social 
enterprises want to access capital from multiple sources, each of whom 
seeks a different balance of social and financial ends.  For several years, 
scholars have been describing the ability to provide a tranched 
investment strategy as a significant benefit to social enterprises seeking 
capital.38 
C.  Tranched Investing 
As discussed above, numerous legal scholars have referenced the 
desire of social entrepreneurs to be able to make use of a tranched 
investment strategy.39  It has most often been associated with the new 
business form created for social enterprises called the Low-Profit 
 
 36  As Brian Galle points out, basic agency-cost theory suggests that dual-purpose 
entities (like those that seek both a social and a financial bottom line) are likely to 
generate monitoring costs so high as to make these entities inefficient except under 
certain circumstances.  See Galle, supra note 3, at 2031–33.  This is especially true if the 
dual-purpose entities have a single class of dual-purpose investors.  This Article argues 
that these costs are somewhat mitigated if there are at least two classes of investors and 
if the law protects against private inurement by the charitable investors, as it would in 
a non-profit structure. 
 37  See supra note 34. 
 38  See supra note 13. 
 39  See supra note 13. 
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Limited Liability Company (“L3C”),40 but there is nothing preventing 
one from using a tranched investment strategy with a traditional LLC 
or any type of partnership, limited partnership, or even an old-school 
business corporation.41 
Every tranched investment strategy shares one characteristic: it 
seeks to decrease the risk and/or increase the return for one set of 
investors by increasing the risk or decreasing the return for another 
set of investors.  Imagine a two-tranche investment in the Cookstove 
Project.  Instead of separating the provision of free stoves and the 
operation of the ethanol supply chain, a single entity would do both.  
But that entity would be funded by two different types of investors. 
A “senior” tranche would be made up of market-rate or quasi-
market rate investors who have the right to payment of profits from the 
operations before any profits are paid to the “junior” tranche.  This 
senior market tranche presumably would be made up of equity 
investors,42 which may include the social entrepreneur and his family, 
an independent angel investor, or multiple independent individual 
investors (perhaps through some sort of crowdfunding).43  Let’s call 
the senior market rate tranche of investors the “Subsidized Tranche,” 
since it receives a potentially higher return than the other tranche. 
The “junior” tranche would be made up of below-market 
investors. This junior tranche could be made up of socially conscious 
investors who are willing to risk very low or no return on their 
investment because they care deeply about the social purpose of the 
project.  It could also be made up of a charity or charities that want to 
 
 40  See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 15; Callison & Vestal, supra note 15; Matt F. 
Doeringer, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and International Analysis, 20 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 291 (2010); Kleinberger, supra note 15; Murray & Hwang, supra note 
2; Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing the Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI. KENT L. 
REV. 619, 628 (2010). 
 41  See, e.g., Brewer, supra note 11 (generally discussing the usefulness of various 
business forms for tranched social enterprises and advocating a contract hybrid using 
multiple LLCs). 
 42  Most other scholarly articles on tranched structures assume that the subsidizing 
tranche will be made up of a loan, not an equity interest.  See, e.g., Brewer, supra note 
11.  But in order to explore the legal issues in greater depth and scope, it is useful to 
imagine that both the subsidized tranche and the subsidizing tranche are both equity-
type investments, in that they are receiving a return on their investment based on the 
net income of the venture. 
 43  Among social entrepreneurs, there is some hopeful optimism that small-scale 
social investors may fund social enterprises through investments when they would not 
have funded the same projects with pure donations.  There have been incremental 
changes to a variety of laws to make such investing a legal possibility.  See Jenna 
Wortham, Law Opens Financing of Startups to Crowds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/technology/law-opens-financing-of-start-ups-
to-crowds.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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make below-market investments.  As discussed below, the distinction 
between these two options is extremely important from a legal and 
regulatory perspective.44  For the present, we will assume that the 
investor in the junior below-market tranche is a charitable entity called 
the Earth Charity, which is devoted to slowing global warming. 
Whatever the nature of the Earth Charity’s investment or 
donation to the Cookstove Project, the fundamental characteristic of 
this junior tranche is that any financial return paid to the Earth Charity 
will be paid only after a return has been paid to the Subsidized Tranche 
(making it more risky), or it will be paid at a lower rate than the return 
paid to the Subsidized Tranche (making it less potentially profitable), 
or both.  Let us call this tranche of investors the “Subsidizing Tranche,” 
since it will receive a potentially lower or more risky return than the 
Subsidized Tranche.  Thus, there are two tranches: (i) a Subsidized 
Tranche made up of private investors seeking a market or quasi-market 
return on their investment who hold an equity interest; and (ii) a 
Subsidizing Tranche made up only of the Earth Charity, a charitable 
organization with an interest that is subordinate and provides a below-
market return on its investment.  While this structure is a simplification 
of the tranched investment strategies proposed by prior 
commentators, it contains the basic elements discussed by those 
commentators.45 
To be clear, the benefit that flows to social enterprises with a 
tranched investment structure is not the benefit of tax exemption 
itself.  These entities are not non-profit tax-exempt organizations 
under current law.  While some commentators have begun to advocate 
for these types of entities to be afforded tax benefits,46 Lloyd Mayer and 
 
 44  When no tax-exempt organization is involved in the transaction, the laws that 
apply to tax exempt organizations do not apply, and so there are fewer legal issues, but 
also less protection for below-market investors seeking a social return.  See infra text 
accompanying note 71.. 
 45  See Reiser, supra note 40, at 628 (calling the charitable tranche, the “equity 
tranche,” the market investment tranche the “senior tranche,” and the below-market 
investment tranche the “mezzanine tranche”).  See also Archer, supra note 13, at 174–
75 (describing a structure in which a private foundation takes on the highest risk and 
an expected low return, a “socially responsible investor” takes on “moderate risk” and 
an expected slightly higher return, and “a profit sector investor” takes “the lowest risk” 
and an expected highest, but still moderate, return); Bishop, supra note 15, at 263 
(“[T]he foundation tranche [is] allocated a high-risk L3C investment slice but with a 
below-market return for such a risk.  Having laid off the high risk and low return to 
the foundation, the L3C may then market the low-risk, but above-average market 
returns to attract commercial investors, all in the name of charity.”). 
 46  See Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 13, at 390 (“[T]here have already been calls for 
these forms to receive some or all of the tax benefits enjoyed by charities.”).  See also 
id. at 391 (“[S]ome commentators have supported the extension of the tax benefits 
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Joseph Ganahl have made a compelling case that such benefits should 
not be directly available to such entities.47  But because of the tranche 
structure, some of the benefits that are afforded to tax-exempt 
charities can be passed along to social enterprises in the form of a 
subsidizing investment.  In effect, the tranched structure allows a tax-
exempt charitable organization to receive tax benefits, in the form of 
tax-deductible contributions or tax-free income, and then use those 
benefits to reduce the cost of capital for the social enterprise in which 
it invests. 
The Subsidizing Tranche could be structured in a variety of ways 
reflecting a variety of potential financial returns on the charity’s 
investment.  At one extreme, the Subsidizing Tranche could be a grant 
or donation.  A grant’s defining characteristic is that the donor 
receives no financial return on its investment at all.  Its sole return is 
social, in the sense that it advances its social or charitable mission.  
Obviously, in that case, the Subsidizing Tranche’s investment provides 
a lower financial return because the financial return is zero.  In the 
middle of the spectrum, the Subsidizing Tranche could be structured 
as a loan.  A loan pays a fixed return as a percentage of the amount of 
money provided.  If the Subsidizing Tranche was structured as a loan, 
it would pay a fixed return that was less than the entity could receive if 
it tried to obtain a loan from a purely financial investor.  The rate may 
still be high compared to interest rates on relatively safe investments, 
because market interest rates are determined based on predictions 
about how certain one is that a borrower will be able to pay back the 
principal and pay the interest.  On the other end of the spectrum, the 
investment could be structured as an equity interest in the Cookstove 
Project.  The defining characteristic of an equity interest is that it pays 
a return that is not a fixed percentage of the amount borrowed, but a 
percentage of the profits of the venture.  In this scenario, the 
Subsidizing Tranche would receive a return on its investment either 
only after the Subsidized Tranche received a return of some amount 
on its investment, or as a smaller percentage of the profits relative to 
the amount of capital provided, or both.  For the purposes of this 
Article, we will assume that the Earth Charity takes a subordinate equity 
interest in the Cookstove Project that pays a smaller return on its 
capital investment than the Subsidized Tranche. 
 
historically enjoyed by nonprofit entities to other types of entities that pursue the 
public good.”). 
 47  See Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 13, at 391 (“Our conclusion is that the bare fact 
that hybrids have public-benefitting goals in addition to profit-seeking goals does not 
provide sufficient grounds for giving hybrids these tax benefits for four reasons, each 
of which arises from the difficulty of defining and policing ‘public benefit.’”). 
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Because academic commentary has largely associated tranched 
investing with the L3C, most of the legal analysis of tranched investing 
has focused on the special rules that apply to so-called “program-
related investments” (“PRIs”).  This focus is buttressed by a (perhaps 
unfounded) belief that the most likely providers of social investments 
are or will be private foundations.48  Private foundations are a 
subcategory of 501(c)(3) organizations, and they are subject to a series 
of restrictions that other 501(c)(3) organizations do not face.  For 
example, private foundations are prohibited from making certain risky 
investments49 and are required to distribute at least five percent of their 
assets in grants every year.50  If an investment qualifies as a PRI, the 
private foundation is free from the prohibition on risky investments51 
and can count the full amount invested as part of its five percent 
minimum distribution in the year in which the investment is made.52  
Determining whether an investment in a social enterprise qualifies as 
a PRI may be a complicated matter,53 and one significant goal of social 
enterprise legal reformers has been to streamline that process, 
presumably to unlock some potential investments currently hampered 
by the restrictions on private foundations.54  This is a worthy task.  But 
the PRI rules apply only to private foundations, and so investments by 
charities that are not private foundations do not need to comply with 
them.55 
 
 48  See, e.g., Maximilian Martin & Arthur Wood, Unfreezing the Foundation Asset 
Landscape to Create a Liquid Social Capital Market, TOTAL IMPACT ADVISORS 105, 
http://www.totalimpactadvisors.com/sites/totalimpactadvisors.drupalgardens.com/f
iles/library_items/Copy%20of%20SSRN-%20Unfreezing%20Capital%20Markets.pdf  
(“[C]haritable foundations emerge as a potentially major source of capital.”) (2008). 
 49  See I.R.C. § 4944. 
 50  See id. at § 4942. 
 51  See id. at § 4944(c). 
 52  See Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)-2(c)(3)(ii)(d)(1983). For a general introduction 
of PRI issues in a social enterprise context, see Murray & Hwang, supra note 2, at 24–
26. 
 53  As Brian Galle points out, “The details are boring for most readers.”  Galle, supra 
note 3, at 2042. 
 54  See, e.g., Brewer, supra note 11, at 682 (“[B]oth the proponents and opponents 
generally recognize that PRIs are underutilized”); Martin & Wood, supra note 48, at 
105 (“[C]haritable foundations emerge as a potentially major source of capital.”). 
 55  See I.R.C. § 4944(c) (exception for program-related investments from jeopardy 
investment rule, which applies only to private foundations); but see James P. Joseph, 
Program-Related Investments and You—Perfect Together, 20 TAX’N OF EXEMPTS 10, 11 (2010) 
(arguing that non-private foundations should use the PRI rules when making mission-
related investments because “the PRI rules offer useful guidance on how to structure 
an investment by a public charity to ensure that the investment qualifies as a charitable 
activity that will not be subject to UBIT or constitute private benefit that jeopardizes 
the public charity’s tax-exempt status”). 
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But there are potential legal impediments to a tranched 
investment strategy other than the PRI rules.  These impediments 
apply to all 501(c)(3) organizations, not just private foundations, and 
are conceptually more foundational than the specific PRI rules.  The 
focus on private foundations and PRI rules has resulted in a general 
lack of treatment of the foundational issues associated with tranched 
investments, and even when these legal issues are addressed, the 
discussion is unnecessarily distracted by concerns that apply only to 
private foundations and their specific rules.56  For that reason, this 
Article addresses the non-PRI legal issues.  In order to do so, it assumes 
that the Earth Charity is a public charity rather than a private 
foundation, and so none of the donors/investors in the Cookstove 
Project are private foundations. 
D.  The Subsidy Problem 
A reader is likely to have one of two instinctive responses to my 
description of a tranched investment strategy—one positive and one 
skeptical.  Really one should have both reactions simultaneously.  On 
the one hand, a reader should be outraged.  After all, a tranched 
investment strategy means that a federally recognized tax-exempt 
charity will provide funds to a for-profit business enterprise with the 
expectation that it may not receive any of its money back.57  Even worse, 
the charity fully understands that other private investors may receive a 
return on their investment, even when the charity does not.  
Furthermore, even if both the charitable investor and the private 
investors receive a financial return on their investment, the private 
investors will receive a higher rate of return than the charity.  
Charitable donors presumably contributed the charity’s investment 
and trusted the charity to observe its duty to use those funds to advance 
the organization’s tax-exempt purpose.  Perhaps even more 
importantly, the government granted tax benefits both to the donors 
 
 56  An excellent article addressing the private foundation rules in detail is Brewer, 
supra note 11, at 715–19 (describing a “contract hybrid” structure that enables a 
community grocery to access both equity capital from private investors and a below-
market loan from two tax-exempt foundations).  See also Archer, supra note 13, at 174–
75 (describing a three-tranche structure in which (i) a charitable foundation takes a 
lowest-priority interest with a 1 percent return; (ii) a “socially responsible investor” 
takes a middle tranche with a 3 percent return; and (iii) a “profit-sector investor” 
makes a 50 percent capital investment with the lowest risk but with a “market 
competitive six percent rate of return”). 
 57  In the private foundation context, investments that are too risky or that promise 
too low returns may be subject to penalizing excise taxes under section 4944 of the 
Code, unless those investments constitute “program related investments.”  See I.R.C. § 
4944(c).  No comparable explicit penalty regime exists for public charities. 
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of the charity (tax deductible contributions) and to the charity itself 
(tax exemption on investment earnings) for the purpose of 
encouraging the pursuit of the organization’s charitable purpose.58  
Those tax benefits were not given to enrich private investors.  A 
tranched investment strategy appears to potentially create a situation 
in which the charity is subsidizing the profits earned by the private 
investors, and that seems deeply troubling.59  In this Article, the term 
“subsidy problem” is used to refer to the concern that private investors 
in a tranched investment strategy may be diverting charitable funds to 
enhance their profits.60 
On the other hand, one might think that the structure is not 
troubling at all.  After all, there is no reason why the traditional non-
profit sector should have a monopoly on producing social goods.  The 
idea that the business community should not address its peculiar 
genius to the problems that face the world, and that one good way to 
do that would be for it to partner with the non-profit sector, seems 
completely plain.  Whether such partnerships are called “border-
crossings”61 or “hybrids”62 or just “social enterprises,” some 
commentators believe that these entities have the potential to increase 
the social good.63  Furthermore, the idea that these hybrid social 
enterprises would combine a subsidized investment by a charity with 
investors who want a return financial return of some sort should not 
be surprising.64  The best way to access large quantities of capital for 
 
 58  See, e.g., Galle, supra note 3, at 2042 (pointing out that tax-exemption creates a 
higher return for charitable investors whose profits are free from federal tax). 
 59  In When the Law is Understood—L3C No (William Mitchell Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 2010-07, 2010), Daniel S. Kleinberger and J. William Callison provide an 
example of an “outraged” reaction: 
Foundations have the privileges of tax-exempt status and the ability to 
receive deductible contributions.  Tranched investing runs the risk of 
exporting these privileges to benefit non-charitable businesses, 
managers, and investors.  Tax law has a term for this sort of private 
benefit—private inurement—and transactions that create private 
inurement cause large and potentially debilitating problems for 
charitable organizations.  Properly constructed, a tranched investment 
arrangement might well survive IRS scrutiny, but it is dangerous to 
advocate tranched investing by foundations as a generic, easily designed, 
and readily-available device for social progress. 
See also Bishop, supra note 15, at 265; Callison & Vestal, supra note 15, at 292. 
 60  See supra note 15. 
 61  See Tahk, supra note 2, at 492. 
 62  See Reiser & Dean, supra note 15. 
 63  See, e.g., Tahk, supra note 2, at 494 (“[F]ederal tax law not only should accept 
the reality that organizations cross sectorial borders, but should also consider how to 
direct those crossings in ways that produce social benefit.”). 
 64  Among other things, governments often partner with the business community 
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scaling a potentially expensive or capital-intensive project is to offer a 
competitive financial return to providers of that capital.65 
But whichever instinctive reaction a reader has, it is clear that a 
tranched investment strategy has a potential dilemma at its heart.  The 
tranches are premised on the idea that some investors are willing to 
take a lower return or greater risk in order to facilitate the social 
benefit that the enterprise seeks to advance.  They want to provide a 
subsidy to further the enterprise’s social mission.  But there is always 
the potential for this subsidy to be diverted from the social mission and 
used to enrich the market-rate investors.  That is because there is no 
obvious method for evaluating whether the market-rate investors are 
receiving a market-rate return on their investment or an above-market 
return.  That is not to say that no measurement is possible.66  But it is 
hard to imagine a one-size-fits-all measurement system that could 
provide the basis for government regulation of the whole sector. 
If one thinks there is at least some value in both reactions, then 
one may want to explore a legal or regulatory regime that permits 
tranched social enterprises but imposes some restrictions on how they 
are structured.  In fact, the federal tax code contains exactly such a 
regulatory regime.  The next section discusses the federal tax regime 
that regulates tranched social enterprises, and explores whether it 
strikes the proper balance between protecting donors and the 
government against abusive misdirection of charitable contributions 
(and the tax benefits that accompany them) and encouraging (or 
refraining from discouraging) capital formation for socially beneficial 
enterprises. 
II.  THE PRIVATE INUREMENT LEGAL REGIME 
Tax laws regulate tranched investment structures for social 
enterprises, but only if one of the investors is a recognized tax-exempt 
organization.  If the structure involves a tax-exempt organization (as 
the Cookstove Project does), the solution to the “subsidy problem” has 
at least two distinct components.  First, tax-exempt philanthropic 
investors are bound by the “private inurement doctrine” and certain 
ancillary laws that support the private inurement doctrine such as the 
 
to provide social goods by providing direct tax subsidies for certain activities, like the 
provision of low-income housing, or by contracting directly with for-profit firms to 
provide those goods. 
 65  See, e.g., Arthur Wood, New Legal Structures to Address the Social Capital Famine, 35 
VT. L. REV. 45 (2010). 
 66  See discussion infra note 100. 
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penalties imposed by the Tax Code on “excess benefit transactions.”67  
These laws apply generally to prevent the people who exert control 
over a charitable organization from diverting its funds into their own 
pockets.  In this Article, I generally call this set of laws the “Private 
Inurement Regime.” 
Investors in social enterprises that are tax-exempt charitable 
organizations are also bound by a second set of rules.  These rules seek 
to prevent a diversion of funds or energy away from the organization’s 
charitable mission, but apply whether or not the potential beneficiaries 
of the diversion are in a position to control the charity.  This second 
set of rules includes the so-called “private benefit doctrine” as well as 
the IRS’s “joint venture rules,” which are derived from the private 
benefit doctrine.  I call this second set of laws and rules the “Private 
Benefit Regime.”68  The essential difference between the two regimes 
is that the Private Inurement Regime applies only when some person 
who exerts control over a charitable entity obtains some private benefit 
from that charity or its funds. Whereas the Private Benefit Regime 
applies even when the person who obtains a private benefit from the 
charity or its funds does not exert control over the charity.69 
Note that the current legal regime applies only if the 
philanthropic investor is an exempt organization.70  Thus, there is a 
second very different legal regime that applies if none of the 
philanthropic investors are tax-exempt organizations.  If private 
philanthropic investors want to make a below-market investment in a 
tranched social enterprise, they are not subject to the private 
inurement rules, the joint venture rules, or the special rules for private 
foundations.71 
 
 
 67  See I.R.C. § 4958. 
 68  There is a third separate regime that applies only to so-called private 
foundations, that includes the “program related investment” restrictions, among other 
things. 
 69  Despite the fact that these regimes are fundamentally different, “These 
doctrines are often incorrectly used interchangeably.”  See Nicholas A. Mirkay, 
Relinquish Control! Why the IRS Should Change its Stance on Exempt Organizations in 
Ancillary Joint Ventures, 6 NEV. L.J. 21, 29 (2006) (citing Distinguishing Between Private 
Benefit and Inurement, TAX-EXEMPT ADVISOR (CCH), Dec. 11, 2000, at 9). 
 70  Evelyn Brody, Business Activities of Nonprofit Organizations: Legal Boundary 
Problems, in JOSEPH J. CORDES & C. EUGENE STEURLE, NONPROFITS & BUSINESS 90 (2009) 
(“Keep in mind, though, that the tax system’s benefits are limited and, because 
favorable tax treatment is essentially elective, and organization may simply forego tax-
favored status if it wishes to avoid the strings that come attached.”). 
 71  This is because application of federal law to charities only applies when those 
charities seek tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(a). 
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This section deals with the laws that apply when the investors in 
the Subsidizing Tranche are charitable entities.  Remember, legal 
reformers have consistently stated that one prominent goal of social 
entrepreneurs is to be able to access capital from both charitable 
sources and regular capital markets,72 and so it is accordingly important 
to deal extensively with the law that applies to such mixtures of capital. 
A.  Private Inurement 
The first and most obvious legal solution to the subsidy problem 
is the prohibition on “private inurement” that applies to exempt 
organizations.  Section 501(c)(3) of the Code mandates that “no part 
of the net earnings of [a qualifying organization] inures to the benefit 
of any private shareholder or individual[.]”73  This provision is the basis 
of the so-called “nondistribution constraint.”74  It is what distinguishes 
non-profit organizations from for-profit organizations.75  And, it is this 
prohibition that prevents 501(c)(3) organizations from directly 
accessing capital from equity investors, since the IRS has held that a 
501(c)(3) organization with shareholders who are entitled to a portion 
of its profits is per se engaged in private inurement.76  This per se 
inurement originates in the plain language of the statute, which 
emphasizes “net earnings” flowing to “private shareholders.”  Thus, 
direct equity ownership of a 501(c)(3) organization is impossible 
because of the private inurement doctrine.77 
But, in addition to preventing 501(c)(3) organizations from 
directly accessing equity capital, the private inurement prohibition 
potentially affects investments by 501(c)(3) organizations in a venture 
that itself has equity investors.  That is because the most common 
meaning of “private inurement” is much broader than the transfer of 
 
 72  See supra note 11. 
 73  See § 501(c)(3)(“[N]o part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of 
any private shareholder or individual.”). 
 74  See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 
(1980). 
 75  See BRUCE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 505 (10th ed. 2011) 
(“[I]ndeed, [the doctrine of private inurement] is the fundamental defining principle 
of law that distinguishes nonprofit organizations from for-profit organizations.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 76  Id. at 523 (“With the emphasis of the federal tax law, in the private inurement 
area, on net earnings and the reference to private shareholders, the most literal and 
obvious form of private inurement is the parceling out of an exempt organization’s 
net income to those akin to shareholders.”). 
 77  This is true even if the equity ownership is in the form of so-called “participating 
debt,” in which a debt-like instrument permits the lender to receive a return measured 
by net income.  See Brewer, supra note 11, at 696. 
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net income directly to equity owners, since the “inurement prohibition 
serves to prevent anyone in a position to do so from siphoning off any 
of a charity’s income or assets for personal use.”78  Thus, in general, 
private inurement involves (1) one or more insiders79—people who are 
in a position to control the charity—and (2) some excessive benefit 
flowing to those people—something more than just reasonable 
compensation for their provision of property or services to the 
charity.80 
If private inurement involves a 501(c)(3) organization “siphoning 
off” funds to insiders, then a 501(c)(3) organization’s investment in a 
social enterprise could constitute private inurement if one or more 
insiders owned the social enterprise, and if the investment constituted 
an excessive benefit.  Several commentators have explained why the 
private inurement rules (among others) prevent social enterprises 
from operating as tax-exempt organizations,81 and some have 
mentioned that the private inurement doctrine may be a problem for 
tranched investing in social enterprises,82 but none have analyzed in 
any depth how the rules impact such an investment.83 
 
 78  I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39862 (1991).  See also John D. Colombo, In Search of 
Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1067 (2006) (“The [private inurement] prohibition 
refers to ‘siphoning off’ the income or assets of the exempt organization via non-arm’s-
length transactions with ‘insiders.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 79  See, e.g., United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 
1999) (“The term ‘any private shareholder or individual’ in the inurement clause of 
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code has been interpreted to mean an 
insider of the charity.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)–1(c)(1982) (defining “private 
shareholder or individual” as “persons having a personal and private interest in the 
activities of the organization”). 
 80  See, e.g., I.R.S. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS HANDBOOK (IRM 7751) § 342.1(3) 
(“[T]he prohibition of inurement, in its simplest terms, means that a private 
shareholder or individual cannot pocket the organization’s funds except as reasonable 
payment for goods or services.”). 
 81  See Brewer, supra note 11, at 697–98 (briefly describing the law); Id. at 708 
(“[T]he prohibitions on private inurement . . . prohibit tax-exempt status for an 
organization that issues equity-like debt to insiders.”). 
 82  See, e.g., supra note 15; Bishop, supra note 15, at 264–65 (“[T]he tranche-
investment notion potentially violates the private inurement restriction” but “these 
questions are yet unanswered, and general guidance is sought from related 
authorities.”). 
 83  Brewer does not address any potential private inurement in his “contract 
hybrid” tranched investment model because he assumes that the charitable tranche is 
wholly independent from the market tranche, and so no “insiders” in the charity are 
also investors in the social enterprise, negating the possibility of private inurement.  See 
Brewer, supra note 11, at 716–18.  Archer likewise does not address the private 
inurement rules because he also assumes that “[t]he private investors in the L3C’s 
market tranche will normally be considered ‘outsiders’ because they lack direct 
influence over the foundation’s affairs.”  Archer, supra note 13, at 190. 
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Because the private inurement doctrine demands not just an 
excess benefit, but also an “insider,” it would only impact a hybrid 
social enterprise if the investors in the Subsidized (market-level or 
quasi-market-level) Tranche were related to insiders in the charitable 
organization that made the subsidizing (below-market or purely 
charitable) investment.  For example, in the Cookstove Project, which 
has a Subsidized Tranche of equity owners and a Subsidizing Tranche 
comprised of the Earth Charity, private inurement could exist only if 
the owners of the Subsidized Tranche (or their relatives) had some 
sort of influence or control over the Earth Charity.  If any of the 
investors in the Subsidized Tranche were the founder of the Earth 
Charity, or a board member, or the executive director, or the husband 
of the executive director, or even potentially a substantial contributor 
to it, there would be the possibility of private inurement.  Private 
inurement law, however, is relatively undefined, and it is not entirely 
clear either what type of relationship constitutes influence or control 
or what type of benefit constitutes inurement. 
B.  Excess Benefit Transactions 
While the inurement doctrine is somewhat imprecise, it has been 
bolstered and supplemented by more detailed statutory schemes that 
arguably serve the same purpose: preventing insiders from enriching 
themselves at the expense of the charity.84  The first more detailed 
statutory scheme was enacted in 1969, and applied only to that 
subcategory of 501(c)(3) organizations called “private foundations.”85  
In 1996 Congress supplemented the private foundation rules with a 
statutory scheme that provides penalties for so-called “excess benefit 
transactions” between insiders and all non-private-foundation 
501(c)(3) organizations (generally called “public charities”).86  These 
penalties are called “intermediate sanctions” because they are 
intended to permit the government to sanction charities for 
transactions that excessively benefit insiders without revoking the 
organization’s tax-exempt status, which was formerly the IRS’s only 
remedy under the private inurement doctrine.87  However, they cover 
 
 84  See Colombo, supra note 78, at 1068 (“Today, the private inurement limitation 
largely has been supplanted by I.R.C. § 4958 . . . which provides statutory remedies 
short of loss of tax exemption for these siphoning transactions.”). 
 85  See I.R.C. § 4941.  In 1969, Congress enacted a statutory regime to punish Private 
Foundations and their leadership if they engaged in “self-dealing” transactions.  Id.  A 
self-dealing transaction is a transaction between a Foundation and a disqualified 
person.  Id. 
 86  See id. at § 4958. 
 87  Hopkins, supra note 75, at 548. 
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essentially the same ground as the inurement rule: situations in which 
the charity enriches certain insiders by providing them an excessive 
financial benefit. 
The strength of the excess benefit transactions rules is that they 
attempt to provide more precision and detail to the law of private 
inurement, even though significant ambiguity remains.  For example, 
the statute defines the type of relationship at issue (a “disqualified 
person”) as anyone who was or is “in a position to exercise substantial 
influence over the affairs of the organization.”88  It defines the “excess 
benefit” as one in which “the value of the economic benefit provided 
exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of 
services) received for providing such benefit.”89  All of the law of excess 
benefit transactions flows from these two deceptively simple 
formulations. 
One starts the analysis only if there is some benefit, since there 
can be no excess benefit transaction without a benefit.  In the case of 
the Cookstove Project, investors in the Subsidized Tranche are 
providing capital in exchange for the right to a portion of the profits 
of the venture.  Receiving a payment in exchange for the provision of 
start-up capital is exactly the kind of benefit that warrants excess 
benefit transaction analysis.  But, remember, the Cookstove Project 
itself is not a tax-exempt organization.  Federal tax law does not 
prevent insiders in the Cookstove Project from benefitting financially 
from its operations, even if those benefits are “excessive.”90  Rather, it 
is the Earth Charity—the investor in the Subsidizing Tranche—that is 
subject to the rules, and so it is the Earth Charity that we must focus 
on in our analysis.  The Earth Charity is providing a benefit to the 
Cookstove Project in the form of start-up capital, and so there is an 
obvious benefit flowing from the Earth Charity to the Cookstove 
Project. 
Once we determine that there is a benefit, we must determine if 
it is flowing to any disqualified persons.  If there are no disqualified 
persons, there is no application of the excess benefit transaction rules.  
There are two ways to analyze the question of whether there are any 
disqualified persons.  First, since the Cookstove Project is itself a legal 
 
 88  § 4958(f)(1)(A).  The term “disqualified person” also includes a family member 
of a person who exercises substantial control, an entity controlled by a person who 
exercises substantial control, and a few other miscellaneous categories of person.  See 
§ 4958(f)(1)(B)–(F). 
 89  Id. at § 4958(c)(1)(A). 
 90  If the insiders are directors, state fiduciary duty law might prevent such excessive 
benefits.  Similarly, state corporation laws prevent corporate waste, which may extend 
to excessive payments to insiders under certain circumstances.  
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entity, it is a “person” who could be a “disqualified person.”  The statute 
defines disqualified person to include “a 35-percent controlled 
entity,”91 which it defines as a corporation, partnership or trust in 
which disqualified persons control more than 35 percent of the voting 
power, profits interest, or beneficial interest respectively.92  Thus, if 35 
percent or more of the Cookstove Project is controlled by disqualified 
persons, then the Cookstove Project itself is a disqualified person.  
Thus, we need to determine which individuals are disqualified persons 
with respect to the Earth Charity in order to determine whether the 
Cookstove Project itself is a disqualified person with respect to the 
Earth Charity. 
In addition to the statute, regulations provide detail about what 
kind of individuals qualify as disqualified persons, and, unsurprisingly, 
the types of persons in this category are generally the same people 
identified in the private inurement context: voting members of the 
charity’s governing body, senior officers of the charity and family 
members of disqualified persons.93  Further, the regulations specify 
that certain people might be disqualified persons, depending on an 
analysis of all the facts and circumstances.  These people include the 
founder of the charity, substantial contributors to the charity, and 
people who control a discrete aspect of the charity.94  So, if directors, 
senior officers, founders, or senior employees of the Earth Charity, or 
a family member of any of those people, own 35 percent of the 
Cookstove Project, then the Cookstove Project may well be a 
disqualified person.  Remember, disqualified persons are determined 
based on their relationship to the Earth Charity, not to the Cookstove 
Project.  If the owners of 35 percent or more of the Cookstove Project 
are disqualified persons with respect to the Earth Charity, then the 
Cookstove Project is itself a disqualified person.  But relationships with 
the Cookstrove Project other than ownership (like management or 
other indices of influence) do not make the Cookstove Project itself a 
 
 91  Id. at § 4958(f)(1)(C). 
 92  Id. at § 4958(f)(3)(A); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(b)(2)(2002). 
 93  See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c)(2002) (including persons serving the function of 
president, C.E.O., C.O.O., treasurer and C.F.O. “regardless of title”). 
 94  See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e) (2002).  The examples in the Regulations suggest 
that in the hospital context, the question of whether a doctor is a “department head” 
may be the factor that determines whether she is a disqualified person or not.  Compare 
Treas. Reg. §  53.4958-3(g), ex. 10 (doctor who is not a department head is not a 
disqualified person) with Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(g), ex. 11 (doctor who is a 
department head is a disqualified person).  See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-36020 
(Sept. 6, 2013) (finding that a doctor who is not a department head is not a 
disqualified person). 
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disqualified person.95  There is a potential excess benefit transaction 
issue if the entrepreneur or others are disqualified persons with 
respect to the Earth Charity—by being directors or officers of the Earth 
Charity—and own at least 35 percent of the Cookstove Project. 
Finally, even if the Earth Charity provided a financial benefit to 
the Cookstove Project (in the form of an equity investment) and the 
Cookstove Project was a disqualified person, there is still no excess 
benefit transaction unless the benefit received is excessive.96  Section 
501(c)(3) organizations provide benefits to disqualified persons all the 
time with no implication of impropriety, much less illegality.  For 
example, 501(c)(3) organizations may pay compensation to employees 
who perform services for the organization.97  They may also pay interest 
to persons who provide capital to the organization in the form of debt.  
These payments are not problematic because the value of the capital 
or services provided is equal to the value of the compensation paid by 
the charity and so the benefit is not “excess.”  A benefit is only excess 
if a disqualified person receives more in a transaction with the 
501(c)(3) organization than he could have obtained in a market 
transaction between unrelated persons.  For example, if a person gets 
paid more salary than he should be paid, that could be an excess 
benefit transaction; if a person loans money to the 501(c)(3) 
organization and gets paid an above-market interest rate, that could be 
an excess benefit transaction; if a person borrows money from the 
organization and pays a below-market interest rate, that could be an 
excess benefit transaction; and if a charity sells its operation to a 
disqualified person for less than it is worth, that could be an excess 
benefit transaction.98 
In the case of the Cookstove Project, the Earth Charity provided 
capital in the form of a below-market equity investment.  The fact that 
the investment is “below market” seems to provide evidence that the 
Cookstove Project received a benefit (start-up capital) that “exceeds 
the value of the consideration” (below-market dividends or profits) 
 
 95  There is some potential confusion in this issue.  As discussed infra in the text 
accompanying notes 113 and 114, both the IRS and some commentators have taken 
the position that control of a subsidiary or joint venture could render a person a 
disqualified person with respect to a charity that is a member of the joint venture, even 
if the alleged disqualified person exerted no influence directly over the charity.  For 
reasons discussed infra, this approach is overly inclusive. 
 96  I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A)(“[I]f the value of the economic benefit provided 
exceeds the value of the consideration . . . received for providing such benefit . . .”). 
 97  See, e.g., World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 958, 969 (1983) (“[T]he law 
places no duty on individuals operating charitable organizations to donate their 
services; they are entitled to reasonable compensation for their efforts.”). 
 98  Caracci v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 379 (2002), rev’d 456 F. 3d 444 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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paid to it for that benefit.99  Thus, with respect to the Cookstove Project 
as an entity, it appears that the transaction is an excess benefit 
transaction.  If the Cookstove Project as an entity is a disqualified 
person, the provision of a below-market investment tranche appears to 
be an excess-benefit transaction, and penalties would presumably 
apply.  Remember, the Cookstove Project is a disqualified person if it 
is a “35-percent controlled entity,” which means that disqualified 
persons own at least 35 percent of the entity.  That seems like a pretty 
straightforward prohibition on permitting individuals who control the 
Earth Charity from owning more than 35 percent of the Cookstove 
Project. 
Even if the Cookstove Project itself is not a disqualified person 
because disqualified persons do not own 35 percent of the Cookstove 
Project, it is possible that there is an excess benefit transaction if any of 
the investors in the Cookstove Project are disqualified persons with 
respect to the Earth Charity.  That is because when the Earth Charity 
provides funds to the Cookstove Project, those funds in effect belong 
to the investors in the Subsidized Tranche, or at least accrue to their 
benefit.  Thus, the provision of start-up capital to the Cookstove Project 
is potentially a benefit to the investors in the Subsidized Tranche of 
the Cookstove Project in addition to being a financial benefit to the 
Cookstove Project itself. 
But, just because a benefit flows to the Cookstove Project does not 
necessarily mean that the benefit flows through to the investors in the 
subsidized tranche.  Remember, the purpose of the subsidy is to enable 
the Cookstove Project to provide a social good-health for poor people 
and lower greenhouse gas emissions for the environment.  If the 
subsidy provided by the Earth Charity is somehow “used up” by the 
social good provided, then there is a plausible case to be made that the 
benefit flowing to the Subsidized Tranche investors is not excessive at 
all.  It is just a regular market-rate return on their capital.  In fact, this 
premise is the basis of the whole structure.  A charity provides a benefit 
to a social enterprise to permit it to do good.  The return paid to its 
 
 99  There is no IRS guidance specifically about charitable investments in the 
subsidizing tranche of a social enterprise, but there is a fact mentioned in a recent 
ruling addressing so-called “ancillary joint ventures” (discussed infra in section IV(B)) 
that pertains to the discussion here.  In Revenue Ruling 2004-51, the IRS ruled that an 
ancillary joint venture will not negatively impact a participating charity’s tax-exempt 
status, so long as “[the partners’] ownership interests . . . are proportional to their 
respective capital contributions, and all returns of capital, allocations and distributions 
by [the partnership] are proportional to [the partners’] ownership interests.”  Rev. 
Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974.  Thus, in the case of a tranched investment strategy, in 
which the ownership interests are not proportional, it is not clear what the IRS would 
conclude. 
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for-profit investors is not “above market;” it is no more than “at market” 
in the sense that it is comparable to what those investors could receive 
in comparable investments if some of the risk associated with the social 
return were removed.  On the other hand, it is not clear how one could 
measure whether the subsidy is “used up” or not, at least not if you are 
the IRS trying to administer a regulatory regime consistently.100 
If it was too difficult to measure whether the benefit is “used up,” 
one could try to measure directly whether the return provided to 
market-rate investors is excessive.  In order to do that, one would have 
to determine what an unsubsidized market-rate return would be.101  But 
measuring an unsubsidized return is very difficult or impossible.  
Remember, a market return is some combination of projected return 
and risk.  If one’s return on investment is a share of the profits of the 
venture, one cannot know what a “market” return would be unless one 
knows what other options were available in the market, what his 
projected returns looked like, and what his projected risk was.  As any 
business appraiser will tell you, these things defy full measurement.102  
And, of course, the fact that the returns were subsidized by the charitable 
tranche’s investment seems like at least preliminary evidence that the 
 
 100  When private foundations make grants to for-profit enterprises, they are subject 
to an information collecting regime called “expenditure responsibility,” which is one 
attempt to determine if a benefit provided by a tax-exempt entity is “used up” or not.  
See I.R.C. § 4945(d)(4) (1969).  Unfortunately, the expenditure responsibility regime 
is difficult to adapt to a tranched investment context, since it requires even in the 
program-related investment context that the grant recipient “use all the funds received 
from the private foundation . . . only for the purposes of the investment.”  Treas. Reg. 
§ 53.4945-5(b)(4)(i) (1972).  This requirement that all funds provided under an 
equity-type investment be “used up” creates significant legal uncertainty, since there is 
no method that has been clearly accepted by the IRS for doing so.  For a general 
discussion of the difficulties involved in measuring social benefit. see Linda M. 
Lampkin & Harry P. Hatry, Measuring the Nonprofit Bottom Line, in JOSEPH J. CORDES & 
C. EUGENE STEURLE, NONPROFITS AND BUSINESS ch. 9 (2009). 
 101  The excess benefit transaction rules provide a mechanism by which a taxpayer 
who follows a series of procedural steps can create a rebuttable presumption that the 
benefit it is providing is not “excessive.”  See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 (2002).  However, 
one of the conditions necessary to create the presumption is that “the authorized body 
obtained and relied upon appropriate data as to comparability prior to making its 
determination [of how much to pay for the benefit].”  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(2) 
(2002).  But this presumption fits very uneasily with a situation in which a charity is 
making an equity investment in a social venture.  It is generally used to ensure that 
compensation paid to executives is not excessive, and while it also applies to transfers 
of funds in exchange for property or the use of property, it is difficult (although not 
impossible) to analogize a transfer of capital in exchange for an interest in future 
profits of a firm for a transfer of money in exchange for a property interest.  In any 
case, it seems unlikely for the reasons discussed in the text that comparability data 
would be readily available. 
 102  See generally DAVID LARO & SHANNON P. PRATT, BUSINESS VALUATION AND FEDERAL 
TAXES: PROCEDURE, LAW AND PERSPECTIVE 172–76 (2nd ed. 2011). 
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returns provided to the market-rate investors are above market rate.103 
The challenge in measuring return is exacerbated because we 
chose for our hypothetical a return that is “equity-like” as opposed to 
“debt-like.”  In general, a debt-like return is one in which an investor 
receives a return that is a fixed percentage of her capital contribution.  
So, for example, in exchange for $100,000, an investor may receive a 
right to the return of that $100,000 plus a fixed 5 percent per year until 
the principal is repaid.  In contrast, an equity-like investment is not 
fixed with regard to the amount invested, but varies depending on the 
profitability of the venture.  So, for example, in exchange for an 
investment of $100,000, an investor may receive a right to one percent 
of the profits of the venture.  Most detailed discussions of tranched 
investment structures assume that the charity’s Subsidizing Tranche 
would be debt-like.104  This may be partially because it seems easier to 
measure whether a debt-like instrument is “below market” or not 
because the availability of information about the credit market gives 
the illusion that it is easy to find a “market” interest rate.  Whereas an 
appropriate equity-like return is a challenge to even conceive.  It is 
important, however, to note that the challenges associated with 
identifying a “market” return in an equity-like instrument infect debt-
like instruments as well.  In both cases, a market return is a function of 
risk, and a comparable rate cannot be identified without an accurate 
assessment of risk in the venture at issue.105  Obviously, assessing risk in 
a venture is an imprecise science (to say the least).106 
 
 
 
 103  It is worth pointing out that the Code expressly provides: 
[T]o the extent provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary, the 
term ‘excess benefit transaction’ includes any transaction in which the 
amount of any economic benefit provided to or for the use of a 
disqualified person is determined in whole or in part by the revenues of 
1 or more activities of the organization . . . 
I.R.C. § 4948(c)(4) (1978).  That provision presumably exists for the same reason that 
paying a share of the profits of a tax-exempt organization is per se private inurement, 
as discussed supra at note 76.  Whether this provision could apply to the proposed 
Cookstove Project’s structure would depend on whether the Cookstove Project could 
be considered an “activit[y] of the organization.”  But, in any case, since the Secretary 
has so far refrained from promulgating any regulations pertaining to the provision, it 
currently has no effect.  See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-5(2002) [Reserved]. 
 104  See supra note 45. 
 105  See, e.g., Lowry Hospital Ass’n v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 850 (1976) (holding that loans 
from a tax-exempt organization were “below-market” even though they were “roughly 
equivalent to the interest rate it was receiving . . . on passbook deposits from the local 
bank” because the loans “represented substantially greater risk”). 
 106  See Laro & Pratt, supra note 102. 
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At bottom it seems that the best we can do is acknowledge that a 
compelling case could be made that a subsidizing investment from the 
Earth Charity to the Cookstove Project creates an excess benefit 
transaction, and that evidence showing that the benefit was not 
excessive would be hard to find or develop.  The case is strongest if the 
Cookstove Project is a disqualified person on account of 35 percent of 
its shareholders being disqualified persons.  The case is weaker, but 
not by any means insignificant, if the Cookstove Project itself avoids 
being a disqualified person itself, but disqualified persons are 
nonetheless investors in the subsidized tranche.  In that case there is 
some risk at least that the IRS will successfully argue that an excess 
benefit flows to such disqualified person investors, especially if no 
compelling method is devised to show that the subsidy is “used up” for 
the social purpose of the Project.  Perhaps the most we can say is that 
there is a significant risk that the IRS will interpret the excess benefit 
rules to mean that the fact that the Earth Charity is providing a 
subsidizing investment in itself constitutes an excess benefit flowing to 
investors in the Subsidized Tranche.  The fact that an argument could 
be made that the benefit is not excessive, while plausible, does not 
remove that risk.  Thus, the excess-benefit transaction rules 
presumably significantly inhibit investment in the Subsidized Tranche 
by disqualified persons.107 
On the other hand, if no disqualified person is an investor in the 
subsidized tranche, the organization should be able to rely on its own 
internal assessment that the subsidizing tranche advances its charitable 
purpose.108  It should not be overly chilled by a concern that the IRS 
will disagree with it about the social value of the social enterprise.  
Remember, the central premise of the entire charitable sector is the 
idea that the non-distribution constraint is the primary check on 
misdirection of funds by charities.109  This central premise should not 
 
 107  It is very hard to quantify how much in the way of potential investments are 
being inhibited by uncertainty in the law, but the penalties can get very large.  For 
example, in Caracci v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 379 (2002), rev’d, 456 F. 3d 444 (5th Cir. 
2006), the total liability arising out of the imposition of excise taxes on the directors 
of a relatively small tax-exempt nursing home amounted to $69,702,390. 
 108  See Archer, supra note 13, at 191 (“To avoid violating the inurement restriction, 
a foundation must only ensure that no individuals with personal or professional ties to 
the foundation take part in the market tranche of the L3C.”). 
 109  In The Role of Social Enterprise and Hybrid Organizations 40 (Yale Law & Economics 
Research Paper No. 485, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2379012, Ofer Eldar writes: 
[C]ontrary to some recent claims that the non-distribution constraint 
has lost its force as a commitment device because for-profits are 
increasingly engaged in the pursuit of social goals, it remains a key 
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be ignored when non-profits invest in tranched social enterprises.  So 
long as the charities and the profit-makers are independent, the non-
distribution constraint should still have force to prevent a diversion of 
funds away from social goals. 
III.  REFORMING THE PRIVATE INUREMENT REGIME 
Some social enterprise legal reformers have asserted that private 
inurement would be a significant problem for hybrid social enterprises 
without analyzing why;110 at least one other has dismissed the private 
inurement doctrine as inapplicable because he assumed that “[t]he 
private investors in the L3C’s market tranche will normally be 
considered ‘outsiders’ because they lack direct influence over the 
foundation’s affairs.”111  Whether they will normally be considered 
outsiders or not, it is at least clear that a tranched investment structure 
in which they are not outsiders will be potentially problematic under 
current law.  It is probably fair to say that under current law any charity 
making a subsidizing investment in a social enterprise should assure 
itself that none of the investors in the subsidized tranche are 
disqualified persons with respect to it.112 
But there is significant ambiguity under current law about the 
scope of the private inurement regime.  On the one hand, there are 
hints in IRS guidance that the IRS believes that a person can be a 
disqualified person with respect to a charity solely because of her 
control over an entity that seeks to advance that charity’s tax exempt 
purpose,113 and at least one commentator thinks the IRS should 
 
component of the commitment devices associated with for-profit social 
enterprises.  The assumption is that organizations which are subject to a 
non-distribution constraint can be trusted to monitor for-profits. 
 110  See Bishop, supra note 15, at 265–67; Daniel Kleinberger, supra note 15, at 893. 
 111  Archer, supra note 13, at 190. 
 112  This position is by no means a consensus among lawyers who advise tranched 
social enterprises or other joint ventures between charities and for-profit entities.  As 
Ellen Aprill has commented (in the private foundation context), “private practitioners 
tell me that there is confusion about indirect self-dealing, that the regulations 
regarding indirect self-dealing add to the confusion, and that one area of particular 
uncertainty is joint investment by disqualified persons and private foundations in 
various investment vehicles.”  See Aprill, supra note 17, at 20. 
 113  See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(g), ex. 7 (2002) (stating that a management 
company that manages a hospital that is the subject of a whole hospital joint venture 
between a charity and a for-profit entity “is a disqualified person with respect to [the 
charity]” even if the management company is otherwise wholly unrelated to the charity 
solely because the management company has “ultimate responsibility for supervising 
the management of the hospital”).  But note that this example, by its terms, applies 
only to a whole venture joint venture in the hospital context, and is therefore 
ambiguous about whether the same analysis applies in an ancillary joint venture 
context or in an investment, loan, or grant that does not constitute a joint venture. 
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embrace this expansive reading of the private inurement regime.114  In 
other words, the director of the Cookstove Project could be a 
disqualified person with respect to the Earth Charity because she 
controls the Cookstove Project, even if she is completely unconnected 
to the Earth Charity.  This expansive reading of the private inurement 
regime would dramatically increase the scope of the doctrine beyond 
merely preventing charitable insiders from benefiting from the 
charity’s subsidizing investments. 
On the other hand, there is also ambiguity about whether an 
equity interest in the Cookstove Project necessarily constitutes an 
“excess benefit” with respect to the Earth Charity when the Earth 
Charity makes a subsidizing investment in the Cookstove Project.  If 
the Earth Charity could show that a subsidizing equity investment does 
not result in an above-market return for the market-tranche 
investors—for example, by showing that the “subsidy” is entirely “used 
up”—then there is no private inurement.  The question of whether the 
benefit flowing to the market-tranche investors is an “excess benefit” 
or not is equally pronounced if the Subsidizing Tranche is a below-
market loan or a grant. 
I propose that the IRS issue guidance that makes clear what seems 
like simple good advice under current law: that the existence of a 
Subsidizing Tranche in a tranched social enterprise creates the 
presumption that the subsidized tranche is receiving an excess benefit.  
Therefore, the private inurement regime requires that any charity 
providing funds to the subsidizing tranche must be independent from 
the Subsidized Tranche.  In other words, the subsidized tranche 
cannot contain any investors who are disqualified persons with respect 
to any charitable investor in the subsidizing tranche.  But it should also 
make clear that a person who is completely independent of all 
charitable investors does not become a disqualified person merely 
because of her involvement with, or control over, the social enterprise.  
In other words, just because the charity is investing in a social 
enterprise does not mean that all the persons who control the social 
enterprise are disqualified persons with respect to the charity. 
 
 114  Nicholas Mirkay characterizes IRS guidance as expressing  “a long-held view . . . 
that a person or entity can become a disqualified person by entering into a contractual 
arrangement with an exempt organization if the contract provides such person or 
entity with the ability to control a portion of the exempt organization’s income with 
no effective limitations or restrictions on possible private inurement.”  Mirkay, supra 
note 69, at 77–78.  He argues that this expansive reading of the private inurement 
doctrine under certain circumstances would permit the IRS to police transactions 
between charities and for-profit partners when they engage in ventures together, 
whether they are social enterprises or not.  See id. at 71–84. 
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Under this proposed guidance, there would be no problem with 
a social entrepreneur creating the Cookstove Project to help poor 
people, slow global warming, and make money.  She could be an 
investor in the market tranche receiving a market return on her 
investment.  She could find a charity or charities, like the Earth 
Charity, to invest at a lower return (or higher risk) in a subsidizing 
tranche of the project, so long as she was not a disqualified person with 
respect to this charity or charities.  She could not be its founder, the 
sister of its president, a member of the board of directors, or a major 
contributor.  But as long as she met this simple requirement, she would 
be free to profit from the Cookstove Project.  This principle would 
apply not only to the entrepreneur investing in the market tranche, 
but also to her compensation.  As long as she was not a disqualified 
person with respect to the Earth Charity, she could be paid a share of 
the profits of the enterprise for her services. 
This may seem like simple good advice, but it has at least two 
significant implications.  First, it means that an entrepreneur who 
wishes to invest in the social enterprise cannot also control any charity 
that invests in the charitable tranche.115  Much of the literature on 
social enterprises has assumed that a founder or entrepreneur will own 
an equity interest in the project,116 and so it is likely that the private 
inurement legal regime prevents social enterprise entrepreneurs from 
controlling the charities that fund their ventures.117  In other words, 
social entrepreneurs seeking charitable investments must find 
“independent” charities interested in funding them.  But it also means 
that tranched social enterprises can be used to provide a profit-related 
financial return to project managers or entrepreneurs.  This responds 
to a rising tide of criticism of the effect of tax-exempt organizations law 
on incentives in the non-profit sector.118 
 
 
 
 115  This limitation may constrain some “philanthrocapitalists” who wish to exercise 
“muscular philanthropy” in which the charitable funder exercises significant control 
over the social enterprise.  See Jenkins, supra note 34.  But it is only a limitation if 
disqualified person with respect to the charity also want to be investors. 
 116  See, e.g., Brewer, supra note 11, at 708. 
 117  See Tahk, supra note 2, at 517 (“Additionally, with the contract hybrid structure, 
the individuals controlling the exempt entity may not benefit financially from the for-
profit business . . . . Correspondingly, investors in the for-profit need to be comfortable 
pursuing a shared mission with an exempt organization they do not control.”). 
 118  See, e.g., Anup Malani & Eric Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 2017, 2065 (2007); M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy 
and the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 607 (2009) (“[T]he government 
should eliminate tax discrimination between producers of altruism.”). 
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This section argues that this proposal is not only expedient as a 
simplification of existing law, but is theoretically justified. 
A.  Evaluating a Strengthened Private Inurement Regime 
If the private inurement regime could provide clear boundaries 
within which tranched social enterprises could operate, one still must 
evaluate whether those restrictions are beneficial or detrimental.  
There is a compelling argument that the private inurement regime is 
at the heart of all regulation of charitable non-profits, and so an 
evaluation of the value of clear enforcement of the private inurement 
regime in the social enterprise context is really an evaluation of 
whether there is value in importing the law of charities into the law of 
social enterprises, at least under certain circumstances.  Remember, 
this importation of the law of charities into the law of social enterprises 
occurs only when a social enterprise seeks capital from charitable 
sources.  It is not triggered when a social enterprise seeks capital from 
non-charitable sources, even if those sources seek a social return and 
are willing to invest in a subsidizing tranche.  Thus, an evaluation of 
whether the private inurement regime is beneficial or not is a question 
of whether (1) it is beneficial to impose the private inurement regime 
on funds that have been donated to charity in a context in which the 
donor received a tax deduction for the donation (and the charity 
received a tax exemption for profits made from the investment of 
those funds), and (2) whether it is beneficial to be able to donate to, 
or invest in, social enterprises that are bound by a no-inurement 
requirement.  I argue that both things are beneficial. 
The question of whether the private inurement regime is 
beneficial is in some ways the same as the question of whether it is 
beneficial to require that charitable entities be non-profits.  As 
discussed above, the private inurement regime is just another word for 
the requirement that a charity be a non-profit: it is what distinguishes 
a non-profit organization from a for-profit one.119  As many others and I 
have noted, the dominant argument for why “non-profitness” is 
beneficial—and therefore why it is valuable for the government to 
enforce the inurement regime—has been Henry Hansmann’s theory 
of “contract failure.”120 
 
 
 119  See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 120  See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 845 
(1980); Henry Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 
506 (1981). 
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This theory, which is sometimes called the “agency theory,”121 
argues that the non-distribution constraint facilitates transactions in 
which a “patron” seeks to give a producer money in exchange for the 
production of some good under circumstances in which it is very 
expensive (or impossible) for the patron to monitor the quality of the 
good.122  The quintessential example of such a situation is when the 
patron seeks to provide money that will be used to provide a good that 
benefits a person whom the patron does not know and will never meet, 
such as when a wealthy donor gives money to a charity to benefit the 
poor in a far-away land.123  In that circumstance, the donor has very 
little information about whether the charity provided a high-quality 
benefit, or if the benefit was even provided at all.  Because it would be 
so expensive for the donor to get evidence of the quality of the good 
provided to the poor, there is an incentive—absent any legal 
intervention—for the provider of the benefit to skimp on quality and 
put any savings in his pocket.124 
The government therefore intervenes to provide some certainty 
to the donor that such expropriation is not occurring.  But it is very 
difficult or impossible for the government (or anyone else) to certify 
the quality of the goods provided directly, since measurement of social 
goods are so variable.  So, a substitution is performed.  Rather than 
monitoring and enforcing a certain quality of goods, the non-
distribution constraint monitors and enforces the financial benefits 
going from the charity to insiders in the charity, on the theory that so 
long as no excessive benefits are flowing from the charity to the people 
who control it, the patron/donor can be relatively assured that those 
benefits are being used in good faith to provide the social goods 
intended by the donor at as high a quality as possible.125  In other words, 
the presumption at the core of the non-distribution constraint is that 
 
 121  See Leff, supra note 32, at 823 (explaining why the term “agency theory” is 
possibly not the best term to use, but that it has become accepted). 
 122  See Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980) 
 123  See id. 
 124  As Brian Galle points out, “Since Hansmann first wrote in the early 1980s, 
scholars have penned a considerable new literature on the exchange of ‘credence’ 
goods, or goods whose quality must largely be taken on faith by the purchaser, ranging 
from legal services to organic foods.”  See Galle, supra note 3, at 2036. 
 125  But, of course, even when non-profit directors are acting in good faith, they may 
well make decisions that are inefficient.  See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Agents Without 
Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Form, 40 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 464 (1996) (“[W]hile the nondistribution constraint might 
convince the patron that the nonprofit is more trustworthy than a for-profit in 
situations of opportunistic behavior, the nonprofit could be even less trustworthy in 
avoiding inefficient expenditures.”). 
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the best way to ensure that benefits are being provided as efficiently as 
possible is to constrain the ability of insiders to enrich themselves by 
skimping on the benefits provided or diverting funds away from 
charitable benefits toward themselves.126 
The existence of non-profit firms is made possible by the 
government’s willingness to enforce the non-distribution constraint in 
situations in which patrons/donors and producers agree that the non-
distribution constraint is the most efficient legal regime to govern their 
transaction.  But this standard explanation does not explain why tax 
benefits—like charitable contribution deduction and exemption from 
corporate tax—should be available only to non-profit firms.  Some 
social enterprise advocates (though not by any means most) have 
identified this apparent unfairness as a justification for extending tax 
benefits to social enterprises that are not constrained by the non-
distribution constraint.127  Where a government subsidy is provided to 
a charitable enterprise, however, the government’s interest in 
advancing the social purpose that the subsidy seeks to advance justifies 
limiting the tax benefit to firms that are subject to the non-distribution 
constraint.128  Several commentators argue that tax benefits should be 
available only to non-profit firms precisely because it is so difficult for 
the government to measure social benefit.129 
But even if the private inurement regime is justified in the 
charitable context, the question remains under which circumstances 
there is a justification for importing it into the social enterprise 
context.  The first answer is that there is a justification for importing 
 
 126  This “best” is of course relative, since the non-distribution constraint is only the 
most efficient means because the quality of the goods provided cannot efficiently be 
observed, either by the patron or by the government.  In most non-charitable 
situations, we assume that a patron can observe the quality of goods, and that in those 
cases it is more efficient to permit the provider of goods to enrich herself by reducing 
costs.  In fact, in most firms we assume that the key to efficient provision of goods 
comes from a combination of competition and the ability of providers to enrich 
themselves by increasing efficiency. 
 127  Malani & Posner, supra note 118, at 2065 (arguing that tax benefits should be 
available to for-profit firms if they operate for “charitable” purposes); Henderson & 
Malani, supra note 118, at 607 (“[T]he government should eliminate tax 
discrimination between producers of altruism.”); DAN PALLOTTA, UNCHARITABLE: HOW 
RESTRAINTS ON NONPROFITS UNDERMINE THEIR POTENTIAL (2008). 
 128  See Leff, supra note 32, at 854–68. 
 129  See, e.g., James Hines Jr., Jill R. Horwitz &Austin Nichols, The Attack on Nonprofit 
Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1183 (2010) (“[A]s a realistic 
matter, it is almost impossible to administer a system that ties tax benefits to public 
benefit provision levels.”); Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 13, at 391 (finding that hybrids 
should not have tax benefits because of “four reasons, each of which arises from the 
difficulty of defining and policing ‘public benefit’”). 
LEFF (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  5:06 PM 
2015] PREVENTING PRIVATE INUREMENT  41 
the private inurement regime into the social enterprise context when 
a charity is passing on its charitable tax benefits by making a grant to, 
or making a subsidizing investment in, a social enterprise.  For 
example, when the Earth Charity makes a subsidizing investment in 
the Cookstove Project, the Earth Charity’s tax benefits are in effect 
transferred to the Cookstove Project.  If insiders of the Earth Charity 
were able to divert those tax benefits to themselves on account of their 
control over the Earth Charity and their investor status in the 
Cookstove Project, then we might worry that the government’s tax 
benefits were being abused.  Because the Cookstove Project (and its 
donors) received a tax benefit from the government (in the form of 
deductible contributions and exemption of income), the government 
has an interest in preventing those funds from being diverted from 
their social purposes to the financial benefit of the very people tasked 
with protecting the social mission of those funds.  Once the 
government has provided a tax benefit to encourage or facilitate some 
charitable purpose, it is reasonable for it to require that benefit to be 
used subject to the inurement regime.  As I discuss in greater detail 
elsewhere,130 the inurement regime may be the most efficient way for 
the government to ensure that its investment in social benefits be used 
for those benefits.  When the private inurement rule is applied to 
prohibit people who control the Earth Charity from profiting from the 
Cookstove Project, this independence of the Earth Charity’s directors 
and managers removes any direct financial incentives to divert the 
Cookstove Project from its social purposes to its financial profitability.  
In addition, once their ability to profit financially from the Cookstove 
Project is removed, their independence reduces the likelihood that the 
Subsidizing Tranche will excessively subsidize the Subsidized Tranche, 
since their only remaining incentive is for the Cookstove Project to 
succeed in its social mission.  The alignment of their interests with the 
social mission of the organization directly benefits the government by 
preventing a diversion of the tax benefits provided by it. 
In addition, in situations in which a charity is making its 
investment with charitable funds, the inurement requirement serves to 
protect not just the government, but also a second class of interested 
persons.  In addition to protecting the government (or the taxpayer, 
which is essentially the same thing), the inurement regime also 
protects people who donated to the Earth Charity.  Whether they made 
their donation with knowledge of the Cookstove Project or not, they 
donated with the understanding that the Earth Charity was bound by 
 
 130  See supra note 128  
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the non-distribution rule, and so a diversion of charitable assets into 
the pockets of the directors of the Cookstove Project would be a breach 
of their reasonable expectations.  In other words, the existence of the 
inurement regime creates reasonable expectations among those 
persons who choose to donate to charities.  They chose tax-exempt 
non-profits on the promise by the government that it would police the 
non-distribution constraint with the private inurement regime, and 
their choice of entity is “efficient” only if that expectation is respected.  
Those people presumably made a calculation that providing funds in 
that way was the most efficient way to provide the social benefit they 
wished to support, and it would be a betrayal of those reasonable 
expectations for the government to refrain from enforcing the 
inurement rule on investments made with those donated charitable 
funds. 
Where no charitable funds are involved, the case for enforcing 
the inurement regime is much weaker.  Many social enterprises do not 
involve charitable funds, and indeed under current law the inurement 
regime does not apply to those organizations.131  Therefore, if no 
charitable funds are needed, a social enterprise can avoid the 
inurement regime, and no independent (non-investor) party is 
necessary to the structure.  But even in cases in which a social 
enterprise does not need the tax benefits provided to charities, if the 
private inurement regime provided clear rules about diversions of 
funds, there might be a benefit for social enterprises to subject 
themselves to it. 
Social enterprises may seek to constrain themselves under a 
clarified and strengthened private inurement regime because of the 
regulatory goal of social enterprise legal reformers.  Social enterprise 
legal reformers seek to free social enterprises from the restrictions 
contained in current law, but they also seek a credible means to 
communicate to their various stakeholders that they are genuinely 
valuing social goals.132  If the private inurement regime was clarified, 
 
 131  For example, a benefit corporation is a for-profit entity with no expectations 
that it will be affiliated in any way with a charitable non-profit.  Therefore, the private 
inurement regime does not apply to it.  See supra note 71.  Ofer Eldar points out that 
all the organizations that meet his somewhat narrower definition of what constitutes a 
social enterprise use nonprofit organizations to monitor the commitment devices used 
by the social enterprises.  See Eldar, supra note 1, at 41 (“The essence of commitment 
devices is that a nonprofit is responsible for identifying a class of patron-
beneficiaries . . . and verifying the transactions with them.”). 
 132  See, e.g., Reiser, supra note 40, at 619 (“[The hybrid form] must . . . offer credible 
commitments to enforce such enterprise’s dual missions.”); Reiser & Dean, supra note 
15 at 1524 (“Social investors need assurance that their willingness to sacrifice financial 
returns will not merely provide a windfall to entrepreneurs.”). 
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and it was clear that it required that an independent charity to assess the 
social impact of a social enterprise’s social purposes—and nothing 
more—then stakeholders, including other social investors, could rely 
on this independent assessment in making their own investment 
decisions. 
In other words, if the private inurement regime was clarified, non-
charitable investors in the Cookstove Project might benefit from the 
imposition of the private inurement regime as much or more than the 
Earth Charity was benefiting from it.  Imagine you are a private person 
who wishes to invest non-charitable dollars in a social enterprise, but 
you care about the social mission as well as the financial mission of the 
enterprise.  If there is a subsidizing tranche of charitable funds, and a 
subsidized tranche of market-rate investors, you fall potentially 
between the two.  You wish to be a subsidizing investor, but you are not 
operating with charitable funds; you have not received any tax benefit 
in the form of a deduction for a donation or tax-free income. 
Now imagine that you have the choice of investing in a social 
enterprise that has a true charitable tranche (like the Cookstove 
Project) or a social enterprise that has no true charitable tranche (let’s 
call it the Cheap Stove Project).  Imagine that you are looking at a 
website that enables individuals to make below-market investments in 
social enterprises, a crowd-source website like Kickstarter (which 
accepts donations) or Crowdfunder (which accepts investments),133 
and you are trying to decide whether to invest in the Cheap Stove 
Project or the Cookstove Project.  The Cookstove Project now has three 
tranches: the subsidizing charitable tranche, the subsidized market-
rate tranche and a second subsidizing tranche made up of socially-
minded individual investors like you.  The Cheap Stove Project is also 
a social enterprise, but it seeks to raise funds from two sources: a 
tranche of market-rate investors and a tranche of subsidizing 
individuals (not charities).  Because the Cheap Stove Project has no 
charitable tranche, it is not subject to the no-inurement rule.  You may 
welcome this structure because it frees the Cheap Stove Project from 
the burden of regulation that accompanies tax-deductible charitable 
dollars.134 
 
 
 133  See Chance Barnett, Top 10 Crowdfunding Sites For Fundraising, FORBES (May 8, 
2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013/05/08/top-10-
crowdfunding-sites-for-fundraising/; see also KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter. 
com/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2014); CROWDFUNDER, https://www.crowdfunder.com 
(discussing various crown-sourcing websites) (last visited Oct. 14, 2014). 
 134  This is the “de-regulatory impulse” discussed supra in the Introduction to this 
Article. 
LEFF(DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  5:06 PM 
44 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1 
But, what at first seems like a burden of the Cookstove Project—
that it has a charitable investor and therefore is subject to the no-
inurement rule—actually gives you a significant benefit.135  First, you 
know that the enterprise has an investor that has more resources than 
you have to evaluate the terms of the subsidizing investment, and 
potentially to monitor the investment to make sure that it is used to 
advance the social purpose.  From an agency-cost point of view, the 
existence of a larger institutional investor is a huge benefit to you, 
because you can free-ride on its analysis, contracting, and monitoring.  
But their efforts only reduce your agency costs if you feel confident 
that they share your interests.  If their interests diverge from yours, 
then there is no value in free-riding on their supervision over your 
mutual agent. 
The private inurement regime is potentially your best assurance 
(although it is obviously far from complete) that the charitable 
investor shares your interest in the social mission of the firm.  That is 
because removing the ability of the charitable investor to divert funds 
to her own pocket decreases the chances that she will do so.  So, as a 
social investor, the existence of a charitable tranche that is bound by 
the private inurement rule means that the government will protect 
your reasonable expectation that the charitable investor will not divert 
funds to her pocket. 
There are two huge caveats to the argument above.  The first is 
that the charitable tranche protects your interest only if your interest 
is in the social mission of the enterprise.  Remember, the Cookstove 
Project has two purposes: social and financial.  You are investing in 
both.  If you are more worried about the Cookstove Project failing to 
provide sufficient financial benefits than you are about the Cookstove 
Project providing sufficient financial returns, then the existence of an 
independent charitable investor gets you nothing.  But in that case, the 
existence of market-rate financial investors should provide the 
assurances you want.  As long as you are comfortable with the 
differences between your investment and theirs, their desire to profit 
may provide some assurance that the financial mission of the 
enterprise will not be ignored, though the gap between the terms of 
your deal and of theirs is very important to that calculation. 
The second major caveat, though, is that this analysis does not 
apply to situations in which you have developed a better system to 
monitor and enforce the social mission of the enterprise.  If you can 
 
 135  This is the “regulatory impulse” discussed supra in the Introduction to this 
Article. 
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make a contract with the Cookstove Project in which social benefit is 
quantified with sufficient clarity and precision that your monitoring 
and enforcement costs are not higher than the costs associated with the 
private inurement regime, then that private system is more efficient 
than the importation of the private inurement regime.136  In that case, 
you should invest in the Cheap Stoves Project and not the Cookstove 
Project.  But in the absence of that situation, which I suspect is less 
common than some commentators might wish, the existence of a 
charitable tranche that is clearly subject to the private inurement 
regime—and therefore is made up of independent people—can be 
very useful to an individual contemplating making a subsidizing 
investment in a social enterprise.137  The application of the private 
inurement rule enables the Cookstove Project to make a credible 
commitment to potential investors that a board of independent 
persons (the Earth Charity) has made an independent evaluation of 
the terms of the subsidizing investment and has decided that it is 
worthwhile from the perspective of the Cookstove Project’s social 
mission. 
Basically, the benefits of enforcing a clarified private inurement 
regime on a social enterprise with a tranche of investors or donors 
using charitable funds are threefold.  If we think of the Cookstove 
Project, we can see that the first benefit of enforcing the private 
inurement regime is that doing so protects the reasonable 
 
 136  Also, if your social goals are very well expressed by third-party verifiers of social 
benefit, like the non-profit B-Lab.  See BCORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation. 
net/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2014).  You may be able to cheaply rely on them to monitor 
social benefit.  But that solution only works if they are diligent in their monitoring, 
and if your social goals are the same as those factors that B Lab measures. 
 137  Brian Galle does an excellent job of identifying some situations in which the 
social good provided by the social enterprise is relatively easily identified, measured, 
and monitored.  For example, a firm operating in an industry that “kills dolphins, 
poisons the water, sells ‘conflict diamonds,’ [or] hired developing-world workers at 
pennies per hour” may have to “sell its products at a discount, pay out higher rates of 
return to investors, pay managers a premium, or all of the above.” Galle, supra note 3, 
at 2037.  He cleverly calls the problem these firms face “cold glow” and discusses 
mechanisms these firms use to “warm” these cold glow effects.  Id.  He points out that 
some of the innovations in social enterprise legal forms may be addressed to more 
efficiently warming cold glow.  But these cold glow firms are just a subset of the more 
general category of firms who pursue social goods that are (relatively) easily 
quantified, monitored, and enforced.  In situations in which social goods are easily 
quantified, measured and enforced, so-called “agency theory” would predict that 
patrons and producers of such social goods might not choose the non-profit form, and 
no subsidized charitable dollars would be needed to spur pursuit of them.  Agency 
theory predicts that the non-profit form is embraced to overcome problems associated 
with quantifying, measuring and enforcing commitments regarding social goods.  
These firms providing easily quantified social goods may be housed in traditional for-
profit corporations, or new social enterprise entities, like benefit corporations. 
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expectations of those people who donated to the Earth Charity.  They 
chose to contribute their funds subject to a legal regime that prevented 
managers or other insiders in the Earth Charity from diverting those 
donated funds to themselves, and they presumably did so because they 
thought that was the most efficient way to advance their social mission.  
Second, enforcing the private inurement regime advances the 
government’s interest (also called the taxpayers’ interests) by 
preventing money that has been subsidized with tax benefits from 
being diverted into the pockets of the managers of the Earth Charity.  
The government provided these tax benefits to the Earth Charity 
under an understanding that the private inurement regime would 
apply, and we should assume that it did so because of its own agency-
cost analysis.  Permitting the Earth Charity to use its funds to enrich 
managers of the Earth Charity through the Cookstove Project would 
violate the reasonable expectation under which the government 
operated when it chose to provide tax subsidies only to organizations 
bound by the private inurement regime. 
The third benefit, however, may be the most important.  By 
enforcing the private inurement regime against the Cookstove Project 
only when it has a subsidizing tranche of charitable funds, the law 
creates a mechanism for the Cookstove Project to create a signal to 
those social investors who are not using charitable funds.  It enables 
the Cookstove Project to say, in effect, there are some social investors just 
like you who think this is a good project, and none of them stand to get personally 
rich from it.  If other investors want to free-ride on the judgment of those 
independent charitable investors, they are free to do so.  On the other 
hand, if there is no tranche of charitable funds, the Cookstove Project 
is clearly communicating the opposite: that there is no tranche of 
social investors who are legally required to be independent.  No 
regulatory effort is being made in any way to ensure the independence 
of any social investors.  If that is not important to the Cookstove 
Project, it can opt out of receiving charitable dollars.  If it is important 
to the Cookstove Project, it can opt in.  The regulatory regime permits 
the Cookstove Project to choose how to signal the market.  It provides 
an opportunity that may well be valuable, but not a requirement if the 
Cookstove Project decides it is not valuable.  It can always choose to 
forego charitable dollars.138 
 
 138  Remember, it can even accept donations for its project without accepting 
charitable dollars.  Arguably, the only limitation is that the donor cannot make the 
donation on a tax-deductible basis, and the social enterprise cannot earn its income 
tax-free.  
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IV.  PRIVATE BENEFIT LEGAL REGIME 
If the private inurement regime is justified because it provides a 
mechanism to satisfy the “regulatory” goals of the social enterprise 
legal reform movement, the same cannot necessarily be said of the rest 
of the rules that the IRS potentially imposes on social enterprises.  
Social enterprise legal reformers are not wrong when they say that the 
federal laws that apply to social enterprises are confusing and 
potentially prevent charities from investing in socially beneficial social 
enterprises.139  Other scholars have addressed the so-called “program-
related investment” rules that apply only to private foundations,140 and 
so I do not address those rules here, but none has yet adequately 
addressed the second major regulatory regime that applies to all 
charities, the “private benefit regime.”  The private benefit doctrine is 
far more ambiguous and therefore potentially far more restrictive than 
the private inurement doctrine, and it therefore has the potential to 
severely restrict the workability of tranched investment strategies if it is 
not properly cabined.  And there is no doubt that from the IRS’s 
perspective, a tranched social enterprise “is ripe for private benefit 
analysis.”141 
This section, introduces the private benefit regime and argues 
that—unlike the private inurement regime, which is essential to 
combatting malfeasance by unscrupulous social entrepreneurs and to 
properly aligning incentives—the private benefit regime should be 
narrowed to apply only in certain clearly-defined situations.  In the case 
of the Private Benefit Regime, that means liberalizing the law to make 
clear that (1) the mere fact that a subsidizing investment may confer 
an “excess benefit” on market-tranche investors does not constitute a 
violation of the private benefit doctrine, and (2) an investment in a 
social enterprise that constituted a relatively small share of a charity’s 
total operational budget (or an ancillary joint venture) does not 
require that the charity maintain ongoing formal control over the 
organization.  Instead, a wide range of commitment mechanisms that 
the charity deems sufficient to ensure that the investment is used to 
advance the charity’s tax-exempt purpose are permissible. 
 
 
 
 139  See, e,g., Archer, supra note 13. 
 140  See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 15. 
 141  Archer, supra note 13, at 188. 
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A.  Private Benefit Doctrine 
The private benefit doctrine is an ill-defined legal constraint on 
the activities of exempt organizations.  Law professor John Colombo 
has pointed out that the IRS used the doctrine to constrain a wide 
range of disparate activities without giving any a precise description of 
its scope.142  Unlike the private inurement doctrine, there is no direct 
statutory source for the private benefit doctrine.  Instead, it is rooted 
in the Treasury Regulations, which interpret the requirement in IRC § 
501(c)(3) that a charitable organization be “organized and operated 
exclusively for” a charitable purpose.143  In describing what charitable 
purposes qualify, the regulations state that an organization is not 
operated for a charitable purpose unless “it serves a public rather than 
a private interest.”144 
The regulations go on to explain that “it is necessary for an 
organization to establish that it is not organized or operated for the 
benefit of private interests such as designated individuals, the creator or 
his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by such private interests.”145  Because of its focus 
on persons who influence the organization (“the creator or his family, 
shareholders”), this sounds very much like a sort of re-stating of the 
private inurement doctrine.146  But unlike the private inurement 
doctrine, the private benefit doctrine has been held to apply even 
when the benefited party is not an insider to the charity at all.147  In 
other words, the list of “designated individuals” is illustrative only, and 
an organization can fail to have a “public purpose” if it excessively 
benefits any person, even if that person exercises no influence or 
control over the organization. 
The second big difference between the private inurement 
doctrine and the private benefit doctrine is that the private inurement 
doctrine is an absolute ban.  If any excessive benefits are paid to 
 
 142  Colombo, supra note 78, at 1064 (“Despite the IRS’s broad invocation of private 
benefit as a policing tool, however (or perhaps precisely because of its broad invocation 
of it), no one really can define the doctrine.”) (emphasis added). 
 143  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 144  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii)(2008)(emphasis added). 
 145  Id. (emphasis added). 
 146  See Colombo, supra note 78, at 1068 (“On first glance, the language in the 
regulation cited above would seem to be little more than an augmented explanation 
of the statutory private inurement limitation.”). 
 147  See United Cancer Council, Inc v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1180 (1999) (“[A] 
violation of [the charity’s duty of care] which involved the dissipation of the charity’s 
assets might . . . support a finding that the charity was conferring a private benefit, 
even if the contracting party did not control, or exercise undue influence over, the 
charity.”). 
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disqualified persons, then a charity can lose its exempt status or owe 
excess benefit transaction penalties.  The private benefit doctrine, 
however, is a clarification of the requirement that a charity have 
exempt purposes and is derived from a regulation that states that a 
charity has a public rather than a private purpose.148  Therefore, for a 
private benefit to disqualify a charity for exempt status, it must be 
substantial enough that it overwhelms the charity’s public purpose.149 
But it is not at all clear how substantial a private benefit has to be 
to disqualify an organization from tax-exempt status.  The Supreme 
Court has stated that “the presence of a single [non-exempt] purpose, 
if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the 
number or importance of truly [exempt] purposes.”150  Thus, 
apparently, the question of how substantial a private benefit must be is 
not strictly quantitative.  In other words, it is not sufficient to measure 
the activities that advance the organization’s charitable purpose and 
compare them to those that advance the private benefit to ensure that 
some acceptable ratio of charitable activities is met.  However, it is also 
not clear what the right measure should be.  The IRS has taken the 
position that a private benefit must be “insubstantial”151 and that 
insubstantiality should be measured both “qualitatively” and 
“quantitatively.”152  But the reality is there is no identifiable standard by 
 
 148  Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)–1(e)(1) states: 
An organization may meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3) 
although it operates a trade or business as a substantial part of its 
activities, if the operation of such trade or business is in furtherance of 
the organization’s exempt purpose or purposes and if the organization 
is not organized or operated for the primary purpose of carrying on an 
unrelated trade or business. 
 149  See Colombo, supra note 78, at 1072–73 (explaining that in General Council 
Memorandum (GCM) 39598 (1987) the IRS took the position that the private benefit 
doctrine differs from the private inurement doctrine both because it applies to any 
economic arrangement with persons other than the charitable class (and not just 
insiders), and because it involves a comparative weighing of private versus public 
benefit (as opposed to any amount of inurement resulting in loss of exemption)). 
 150  Better Bus. Bureau of Washington, DC. Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 
(1945). 
 151  See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598, 1987 GCM LEXIS, at *14–15 (Jan. 23, 1987) 
(“An organization is not described in section 501(c)(3) if it serves a private interest 
more than incidentally . . . . If, however, the private benefit is only incidental to the 
exempt purposes served, and not substantial, it will not result in a loss of exempt 
status.”). 
 152  I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598, 1987 GCM LEXIS, at *15 states: 
A private benefit is considered incidental only if it is incidental in both 
a qualitative and a quantitative sense.  In order to be incidental in a 
qualitative sense, the benefit must be a necessary concomitant of the 
activity which benefits the public at large, i.e., the activity can be 
accomplished only by benefitting certain private individuals. 
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which to measure private benefit. 
Law professor John Colombo has pointed out that in the 
uncertainty over the law of private benefit, there are two primary ways 
in which it might be applied in the future.  One way it could be 
employed would be as a general check on economic transactions with 
unrelated third parties.  In this reading, the private benefit doctrine 
applies to any economic transaction in which charitable assets are 
improperly diverted to someone other than the charitable 
beneficiaries.  As noted above, Judge Posner suggested in United Cancer 
Council that negligent improper diversions of charitable assets to 
private persons (breaches of the directors’ duties of care) might 
constitute violations of the private benefit doctrine.153  Under this 
analysis, the private benefit doctrine would function similarly to the 
private inurement doctrine, but without any requirement that that 
benefited party be an insider.  This interpretation of the private benefit 
doctrine creates significant risk to investors since it can exist in any 
organization no matter the quantity of legitimate tax-exempt activities 
conducted.154  In addition, there is no way to protect against this 
application of the private benefit doctrine by providing benefits only 
to “independent” persons because there is no requirement that the 
benefited person be a disqualified person or an insider.  It is plausible 
that the measure of what constitutes a private benefit would be 
exported from the private inurement regime, and any “excess benefit 
transaction” would constitute a violation, even when the transaction 
was between the organization and a truly unrelated third party. 
Obviously, if this analysis applied, a charity that invests in a 
“subsidizing tranche” in a social enterprise could easily have a private 
benefit problem.  As discussed above, it is very difficult to measure a 
“market rate” return on capital, especially if the capital investment 
results in an “equity-like return.”  Therefore, the use of a tranched 
investment structure in the Cookstove Project likely constitutes at least 
prima facie evidence of an excessive benefit flowing to the subsidized 
 
 153  See supra note 147. 
 154  Theoretically, at least, there is no reason why the private benefit doctrine should 
be confined to situations in which a person receives an excessive benefit.  Because the 
private benefit doctrine is really just an elaboration of the requirement that a charity 
have a proper tax-exempt purpose, provision of a substantial enough private benefit 
should result in revocation of tax-exempt status even if the benefit is not excessive.  
There is a plausible argument that the IRS has addressed this issue by treating excessive 
private benefits as “qualitatively substantial” even if they are not “quantitatively 
substantial.”  Obviously a doctrine that potentially applies notwithstanding the fact that 
no insiders have been benefited and notwithstanding the fact that no excessive benefit 
has been identified is potentially a very broad doctrine.  The doctrine’s application 
relies entirely on the “substantiality” of the private benefit. 
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tranche.  Under the Private Inurement regime, the Cookstove Project 
can protect itself from the adverse legal effects of that purported 
excessive benefit by preventing disqualified persons from investing in 
the subsidized tranche.  But because the private benefit doctrine has 
no “insider” requirement, an interpretation that made any possibly 
excessive benefit problematic would make tranche investing virtually 
impossible. 
The other way Professor Colombo thinks the private benefit 
doctrine could be employed by the IRS in the future would be to 
restrict the doctrine to those situations in which some non-charitable 
purpose has overwhelmed the charitable purpose of the organization 
so that the organization no longer really serves its charitable goals.  
This approach would involve a comparison of charitable activities with 
private benefit activities, such that a sufficient quantity of genuinely 
charitable activities would protect an organization from violation of 
the private benefit doctrine.155  Thus, this approach is unlikely to 
present a problem when the transaction in question is merely ancillary 
to the primary activities of the charity.  Under this analysis, if the 
amount of the Earth Charity’s investment in the Cookstove Project is 
small in relation to its overall activities, then this form of the private 
benefit doctrine is unlikely to be problematic.  Unfortunately, an 
investor could not be assured that the IRS will interpret the private 
benefit doctrine in this “quantitative” way.  Quite the contrary, there is 
reason to believe that the IRS does not view the private benefit doctrine 
as one that is overcome if the quantity of private benefit is less than 
some fixed proportion of the overall activities of the charity.156 
B.  Joint Venture Analysis 
In addition to standing alone, the private benefit doctrine serves 
as the basis for the IRS’s guidance on joint ventures between exempt 
organizations and for-profit partners.157  In its joint venture analysis, 
 
 155  Because of its comparative approach, this interpretation of the private benefit 
doctrine has echoes in other doctrines that constrain exempt organizations, like the 
“commerciality doctrine” and the “commensurate in scope” doctrine.  See generally 
BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (10th ed. 2011). 
 156  See supra note 151. 
 157  The IRS’s interpretation of what constitutes a joint venture such that its joint 
venture analysis would apply is quite broad.  See, e.g., MICHAEL I. SANDERS, JOINT 
VENTURES INVOLVING TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 292 (3rd ed. 2007) (“The term ‘joint 
venture’ in this context includes a partnership as well as any other arrangement that 
accomplishes a comparable sharing or redistribution of benefits and burdens.”).  It is 
not clear that every tranched social enterprise would constitute a joint venture for the 
IRS’s purposes, but it is likely that one like the Cookstove Project, in which the Earth 
Charity and private investors each had equity-type interests in an LLC, would.  
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the IRS has replicated the ambiguity inherent in the private benefit 
doctrine.158  Just as it is unclear whether the private benefit doctrine is 
only a means of ensuring that the organization has a sufficiently 
substantial charitable purpose to justify tax exemption or also a 
mechanism by which the IRS to monitors the organization’s economic 
transactions with outsiders, so too the IRS’s joint venture doctrine 
potentially serves both functions.159  It is not clear from the IRS’s 
guidance on joint ventures whether its joint venture analysis is solely a 
way to ensure that an exempt organization involved in a joint venture 
with a non-exempt partner continues to pursue its charitable purpose, 
or whether it is also a means to ensure that the charitable partner does 
not provide excessive benefits to its for-profit partner.160 
That ambiguity comes from the fact that the IRS’s guidance 
breaks joint ventures into two distinct categories: whole venture joint 
ventures161 and ancillary joint ventures.  A whole venture joint venture 
is one in which a charity conducts all of its tax-exempt activities 
through the joint venture.  In that case, obviously, since participating 
in the joint venture is all that the charity does, it must adequately 
advance the charity’s tax-exempt purpose to justify exemption.  The 
IRS has been relatively clear that it believes that a whole-venture joint 
venture potentially calls into question the charity’s tax-exempt status 
 
Regardless of whether the specific enterprise constitutes a joint venture, the IRS’s 
guidance on joint ventures gives some insight into its evolving interpretation of the 
private benefit doctrine’s application. 
 158  The author of the leading treatise on the topic describes the IRS’s approach to 
joint ventures with exempt organizations as “prohibitively restrictive” and governed by 
“inscrutable laws.”  Id. at xviii. 
 159  In Relinquish Control! Why the IRS Should Change its Stance on Exempt Organizations 
in Ancillary Joint Ventures, 6 NEV. L.J. 21, 31 (2006), Nicholas A. Mirkay writes: 
It is this broad scope of the private benefit doctrine, which encompasses 
and examines all of an organization’s activities (i.e., exempt activities, 
transactions with insiders and/or with unrelated disinterested persons), 
that has resulted in an aggressive expansion and application of the 
doctrine by the IRS in the context of joint ventures. 
 160  Historically, it has certainly been the case that the IRS was concerned with the 
potential for joint ventures to result in private benefit or private inurement as well as 
whether they would divert the organization from its tax-exempt purposes.  In service 
of this goal, “the IRS will look at relative capital contributions and risks of the various 
joint ventures to determine whether capital contributions are proportionate to the 
sharing of profits and losses, among other indicators.”  Sanders, supra note 157, at 293.  
Remember, in a tranched social enterprise, capital contributions are not proportionate 
to profits and losses, but instead the charitable tranche provides more capital in 
exchange for less profits.  Under the IRS’s historical analysis, at least, this situation 
would raise red flags. 
 161  IRS guidance actually only refers to a “whole hospital” joint venture, since that 
was the situation it addressed, and some commentators have adopted the term “whole 
entity” joint venture.  See id. at 25–26. 
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unless the charity exercises formal meaningful control over the joint 
venture.162 
In an ancillary joint venture, on the other hand, the charity 
conducts other activities that justify its tax-exempt status, and the joint 
venture is a relatively small part of the charity’s activities.  In this case, 
if the activities are “incidental” to the charity’s other tax-exempt 
activities, then they should not call into question the charity’s tax-
exempt status even if they do not advance the charity’s exempt 
purpose.  This is because, as discussed above, a charity is permitted to 
engage in some activities that do not advance its tax-exempt purpose, 
so long as these activities are incidental in relation to the charity’s 
overall activities.163  However, the IRS’s guidance on ancillary joint 
ventures is much more ambiguous than its guidance on whole venture 
joint ventures.  The IRS has communicated that in the case of ancillary 
joint ventures, it does not hold the charity to the same control standard 
that applies in the whole venture context.164  It would be logical to 
conclude that an ancillary joint venture does not require control, 
because ancillary activities, whether they provide a public benefit or 
not, are sufficiently insubstantial that they cannot prevent the 
organization from primarily advancing its tax-exempt purpose.165  But 
the rule with regards to ancillary joint ventures is surprisingly 
underdeveloped.166  The IRS has arguably signaled that, at least 
sometimes, it is necessary for the charity to exercise ongoing control 
over an ancillary joint venture.167  Or, possibly, the IRS could take the 
 
 162  See Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 47 (1999), aff’d per curiam, 242 
F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.  See also St. David’s Health 
Care System v. United States, 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirming the control test, 
vacating, and remanding to resolve a genuine issue of material fact about whether St. 
David’s exercised sufficient control over the joint venture). 
 163  See supra discussion accompanying notes 148–152. 
 164  See Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-22 I.R.B. 974. (holding that “[the whole venture] 
continues to qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3) when it contributes a portion of 
its assets to and conducts a portion of its activities through [an ancillary joint 
venture]”).  
 165  Paul Streckfus has described this interpretation of Rev. Rul. 2004-51 as “the 
majority view.”  Paul Streckfus, Ancillary Joint Ventures May Involve Exemption Risk, 47 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 327, 327 (2005).  He writes: 
The majority view is that the only risk posed by an ancillary joint venture 
to an EO is that its distributive share of joint venture income may be 
subject to the unrelated business income tax, but—and here’s the good 
news—participation in such a venture poses no threat to exempt status. 
 166  See Sanders, supra note 157. 
 167  See Mirkay, supra note 19, at 59 (“[A]n IRS representative unofficially issued a 
poignant reminder—Revenue Ruling 98-15 is ‘still on the books’ and ‘Revenue Ruling 
2004-51 does nothing to modify Revenue Ruling 98-15.’”).  Mayer and Ganahl, among 
others, adopt this interpretation of the IRS’s position that Rev. Rul. 2004-51 ruled: 
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position that a joint venture is not “insubstantial” even though it 
constitutes only a small part of what a charity does.168 
In any case, if the joint venture is substantial enough, the IRS 
demands that the charity must “control” the joint venture.  In a “whole 
hospital” joint venture, the charity must have ongoing formal control.  
In the case of an ancillary joint venture, the control standard may be 
more permissive, and may require not formal control, but only 
effective control over the parts of the joint venture relevant to the 
charity’s tax-exempt purpose.  In the case of the Cookstove Project, it 
may be sufficient for the charity to be able to control certain key 
choices in the distribution of cookstoves, like the criteria for receiving 
one, but it may also be important for the charity to retain ongoing 
control over sources of ethanol, given the evidence that clear-cutting 
forests to produce ethanol has adverse environmental effects.  But 
some form of control might be required, and if the social enterprise 
did not want to cede overall formal control to the charity, guidance on 
what type of control would be sufficient does not clearly exist.169 
 
 
 
[I]n a situation where only an insubstantial part of a tax-exempt 
organization’s activities are housed in a partnership, it will be sufficient 
for the tax-exempt organization to only appoint half of the partnership’s 
governing body if the tax-exempt organization has other means of 
controlling the substance of the partnership’s activities to ensure those 
activities further the tax-exempt organization’s exempt purpose. 
Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 13, at n.155. 
 168  See discussion supra note 152. 
 169  Archer argues that the “expenditure responsibility” requirements that apply to 
foundations making grants to, or program-related investments in, for-profit entities 
should constitute sufficient “control” to satisfy the IRS’s control standard in social 
enterprise contexts.  See Archer, supra note 13, at 192–96.  Whether or not the 
expenditure responsibility rules could require the right balance of flexibility and 
control, if they were interpreted correctly, how one would interpret such rules in the 
context of an equity investment in a social enterprise remains unclear.  The 
expenditure responsibility rules require that a foundation “establish adequate 
procedures . . . to see that the grant [or investment] is spent solely for the purposes 
for which made.”  I.R.C. §4945(h)(1) (2006).  This requirement means that a private 
foundation making a program related investment must obtain an agreement that the 
recipient will “use all the funds received from the private foundation . . . only for the 
purposes of the investment and to repay any portion not used for such purposes.”  
Treas. Reg. §53.4945-5(b)(4)(i)(1972).  It is hard to conceive of how this requirement 
would apply to a subsidizing equity investment in a tranched social enterprise, since 
the investment is intended to improve the profitability or lessen the risk of the 
subsidized tranche.  In a Private Letter Ruling that addresses equity investments by 
foundations in for-profit enterprises, the return-on-investment between the 
foundations and the market investors were proportional to their capital contributions.  
See I.R.S. P.L.R. 2006-10020 (Mar. 10, 2006).  There is no guidance from the IRS that 
analyses a tranched structure. 
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As Ofer Eldar has made clear, control is only one of a number of 
commitment devices that social enterprises use to ensure that their 
activities truly advance their social missions.170  Other such devices 
include certification mechanisms, in which third parties certify 
compliance with certain standards,171 and contractual mechanisms, in 
which compliance with social benefit goals are monitored and 
enforced contractually.172  Other areas of the law, such as the 
“expenditure responsibility” regime that applies to private foundation 
grants to non-public charities, envision a number of mechanisms other 
than direct control by which an organization would ensure that its 
investment is used in an appropriate manner to advance its tax-exempt 
purpose.173 
The point is that in situations in which there is no private 
inurement because no disqualified persons stand to gain from a 
subsidizing investment by a charity, it is not clear why ongoing formal 
control is necessary.  Current law is ambiguous about what is required, 
but there is at least a strong risk that the IRS will require some 
undefined quantum of formal control even when a joint venture is 
small in relation to a charity’s overall activities.  Because there are a 
variety of ways for a charity to make sure that its investment is not 
diverted from its social mission, the charity’s independence should 
gain it significant latitude to choose the best one. 
C.  Clarifying or Liberalizing the Private Benefit Regime 
Thus, one thing is very clear: the Private Benefit Regime analysis 
is more uncertain than the Private Inurement Regime and potentially 
creates a much bigger barrier to a tranche investing structure for the 
Cookstove Project.  That is because it is impossible to avoid the 
potential application of the doctrine by finding an “independent” 
charitable investor.  Without the ability to avoid loss of exemption in a 
certain way, some number of investments in social enterprises will be 
chilled. 
There are several reasons why the enforcement of the private 
benefit regime is less compelling than the private inurement regime 
in the social enterprise context.  The first is the simple point that the 
risk of diversion of assets or energy away from the social mission is 
decreased when the members of the subsidized tranche are not 
disqualified persons.  The second centers around the notion that 
 
 170  Eldar, supra note 1, at 40–48. 
 171  Eldar, supra note 1, at 46. 
 172  Eldar, supra note 1, at 48. 
 173  See Archer, supra note 13, at 191–96. 
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confusion itself is a bad thing, since it is dangerous to enter into 
investments if one is unsure of the law that the IRS will apply.  Finally, 
the effect of an overly restrictive regime is likely to be to push social 
enterprises into alternate structures that avoid the reach of the IRS.  As 
discussed above, a social enterprise that does not use charitable funds 
can avoid tax-exempt organizations law entirely.  The cost of pushing 
social enterprises into such structures is that they then lose the 
commitment and signaling benefits of the private inurement regime. 
First, the reason that the no inurement regime applies only to 
insiders is because there is a presumption that the ability to distribute 
profits to oneself is a strong incentive to divert funds from the 
organization’s charitable mission.  In order for outsiders to divert 
charitable funds to themselves, they must first persuade insiders that 
such diversions are a good idea.  The whole edifice of non-profit law is 
built on the belief that the existence of independent directors and 
other controllers creates at least some barrier to such diversion of 
funds.174  If that belief is at all true, then the risk of diversion decreases 
when the benefited persons are not in positions of control over the 
charitable organization.  Obviously, it does not reduce the risk to zero, 
but it nonetheless reduces the risk. 
Second, if the law of non-profit organizations is meant to protect 
the reasonable expectations of donors and the government, then it is 
important for such stakeholders to understand what can be reasonably 
expected.  As discussed above, significant disagreement exists 
regarding whether the private benefit regime is primarily a restriction 
on the quantity of resources that a single charitable investor can devote 
to a social enterprise or whether it is primarily a check on whether such 
investments provide excess benefits to for-profit investors.  If the goal of 
non-profit law is to enable donors (and the government) to choose a 
legal structure that most efficiently enables them to pursue their social 
mission, then ambiguity about the central effect of the law almost 
certainly creates inefficient outcomes.  How could a donor make a 
decision about whether to provide funds through a tax-exempt non-
profit if she cannot predict what types of restrictions attach to such a 
contribution?  Likewise, the whole point of the government providing 
tax benefits to organizations that abide by a specific set of rules is that 
 
 174  John Colombo summarized this instinct nicely: 
[I]t is hard to imagine a situation in which a charity intentionally diverts 
assets at less than fair market value to an outsider.  If a charity enters into 
an economic transaction with someone who has no influence over the 
charity, there is . . . simply no reason to believe that the charity would 
intentionally hand assets over to that person for less than full value. 
Columbo, supra note 78, at 1084. 
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those rules require generalized responses.  Therefore, uncertainty in 
the law does not benefit the government in this context either. 
Finally, an overly restrictive or confusing private benefit regime 
decreases the utility of tax-exempt organization law as a commitment 
or signaling mechanism.  As is discussed above, the existence of a 
charitable tranche in a social investment can be a powerful signal to 
social investors who are not using charitable funds.  These social 
investors are seeking social enterprises that can make credible 
commitments that they are pursuing a social mission—what I have 
called the regulatory impulse.  Because the existence of a tranche of 
charitable funds implicates the law of tax-exempt organizations, a 
tranched social enterprise can use IRS enforcement of the law to make 
a credible commitment that it will observe certain rules in pursuing its 
social mission.  If those rules are unclear, its commitment is valueless 
to social investors.  In the case of a private benefit regime that may or 
may not limit the quantity of funds a charitable investor can invest and 
may or may not provide a check on whether the IRS takes an interest 
in whether the charitable investment creates an “excess benefit” for the 
market tranche investors, the “signal” lacks enough clarity to have any 
effect.  This can be damaging whether the social investors 
underappreciate the force of the law (and think they are making an 
investment in a permissive regime when really it is more restrictive) or 
if they overestimate the force of the law (thinking that the IRS is 
preventing certain types of abuse, for example, which are really just 
not covered by the private benefit regime).  Thus, uncertainty in the 
law creates confusion that diminishes the value of the regulatory 
regime for a variety of stakeholders in a social enterprise.  As discussed 
above, social investors have a choice about where to invest.  If the IRS 
interprets the private benefit regime to prevent tranched investing, 
social investors can always invest in social enterprises that have no 
charitable capital.  But, if they do so, they lose the powerful regulatory 
benefits of enforcement of the no inurement regime. 
If lack of clarity in the private benefit doctrine prevents socially 
beneficial social enterprises from being created, then the IRS should 
clarify the doctrine.  A number of proposals exist for clarifying the 
proper scope of the private benefit regime.175  They share some basic 
characteristics and differ on others.  It is probably the case that any of 
them would be better than none, but analyzing the proposals’ effect 
on tranched social enterprises uncovers some relative strengths and 
 
 175  See, e.g., John D. Colombo,  A Framework for Analyzing Exemption and UBIT Effects 
of Joint Ventures, 34 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 187–90 (2001); Mirkay, supra note 19, at 69; 
Sanders, supra note 157. 
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weaknesses between the proposals. 
Some proposals focus on the fact that the private benefit doctrine 
prohibits only activities that are substantial, and so the doctrine should 
be clarified with some bright-line quantification method for measuring 
substantiality.  Under these tests, a charity engaged in both direct 
charitable activities and transactions that benefit private persons would 
not have to worry about the transactions with private persons so long 
as they constituted less than some fixed percentage of their overall 
activities.  For example, Michael Sanders proposes that an organization 
that invested less than ten to fifteen percent of its assets in joint 
ventures with for-profit entities should be safe from threat of private 
benefit analysis.176  If this analysis were applied to the Earth Charity’s 
investment in the Cookstove Project, it would mean that the Earth 
Charity could be free from anxiety about the private benefit 
transaction so long as its investments in the Cookstove Project—along 
with all other investments in social enterprises—constituted only a 
small part of its overall activities. 
This solution has the benefit of clarity, since an organization can 
have confidence that its transaction does not risk its tax-exempt status, 
but it has some weaknesses as well.  For example, if the Earth Charity 
wanted to specialize exclusively in making investments in social 
enterprises, it would be prevented from doing so.  As soon as its 
aggregate investments exceeded 10 or 15 percent of its overall activity 
it would lose the certainty that its tax-exempt status was safe.  Since 
there are no doubt economies of scale and scope in making 
investments in social enterprises, it would be unfortunate to prevent 
firms from specializing in such investments if there was no good 
justification for doing so. 
Other proposals focus on the question of whether the possible 
private benefit activity advances the tax-exempt purpose of the 
charity.177  For example, in the case of the Earth Charity’s investment 
in the Cookstove Project, the only relevant question would be whether 
creating a market for propane cookstoves in developing countries 
advanced the Earth Charity’s mission of helping poor people and 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  Of course, the problem with this 
question is that it seems open-ended and could therefore subject the 
charity to risk that the IRS would disagree with them.  Luckily, charities 
are already required to determine if revenue-generating activities are 
 
 176  See Sanders, supra note 157, at 223 § 4.5(c).  See also Mirkay, supra note 19, at 
66–67. 
 177  See John D. Colombo, A Framework for Analyzing Exemption and UBIT Effects of Joint 
Ventures, 34 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 187 (2001); see also Mirkay, supra note 19, at 65. 
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“connected” to the tax-exempt purposes, since the IRS requires 
payment of a so-called “unrelated business income tax” (UBIT) on the 
profits from any trade or business that is not related to their tax-exempt 
purpose.178  Since the organization is already required to do an analysis 
of the connection between its revenue-generating activities and its tax-
exempt purposes in order to comply with the UBIT rules, John 
Colombo argues that the private benefit regime should be collapsed 
into the UBIT regime.179  He proposes that a charity should be able to 
be confident that it will not lose its tax-exempt status so long as its 
UBIT-generating activities are not excessive.180  Thus, if the Earth 
Charity wanted to specialize in making subsidizing investments in 
social enterprises like the Cookstove Project, it could do so confidently 
as long as it felt confident that most investments were sufficiently 
connected to its tax-exempt purposes that they would not generate 
UBIT. 
This approach has the benefit of overall clarity (because it has a 
fixed percentage above which an organization cannot go), but it also 
has the benefit of permitting social investing as long as the investment 
advances the charitable purposes of the organization.  In these ways, it 
appears to be both closer to purpose of the private benefit regime, 
given its origin in the purposes clause of 501(c)(3), and more 
permissive of social enterprises. 
Both Colombo’s and Sanders’s approaches prevent the IRS from 
using the private benefit regime to police “excessive” transactions with 
non-insiders.  They do not permit the private benefit doctrine to police 
corporate waste or duty of care to efficiently pursue the charity’s tax-
exempt status, in the way that Judge Posner suggested it might in dicta 
in the United Cancer Council case.181  But this restriction of the private 
benefit doctrine is exactly the strength of both proposals.  If the IRS 
used the private benefit doctrine to police “excessive” transactions with 
non-insiders, it is unclear how they could do so in a way that would give 
any clarity to charities about when their transactions were safe from 
scrutiny.  If the standard was the same as in the private inurement 
regime, then all it would do was apply the “excess benefit” portion of 
the standard in cases in which the recipient of a benefit is not a 
disqualified person.  That reads the whole “disqualified person” 
analysis out of the law and removes any incentive charities have under 
current law to enter into transactions with independent persons. 
 
 178  I.R.C. §§ 512, 513, with some exceptions.  
 179  See Colombo, supra note 177, at 189. 
 180  See Colombo, supra note 177, at 189. 
 181  See supra discussion accompanying note 147. 
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Unless it is restricted under one of the theories proposed, the 
private benefit doctrine potentially allows the IRS discretion to police 
whether a social investment’s terms are too generous.  For example, in 
the case of the Earth Charity’s investment in the Cookstove Project, 
imagine that the project was a huge success and the market investors 
doubled their money.182  Unless there were strong, clear guidance to 
prevent the IRS from treating such a transaction as a private benefit 
transaction, the Earth Charity may reasonably worry that investments 
in social enterprises carried excessive risk under the private benefit 
regime. 
But protecting against excessive benefit is exactly what the private 
inurement regime is designed to do, and it rests on a presumption that 
an independent charity is the best guarantor of social benefit.  The 
structure of tax-exempt organizations rests on a calculated guess that a 
charity controlled by persons who do not stand to personally profit 
from the financial success of an enterprise are the best agents for its 
social mission.183  At the end of the day, the appropriate question to ask 
of this approach is whether the IRS needs a mechanism to oversee the 
quality of transactions under the private benefit regime as well as the 
private inurement regime.  This Article argues that using the private 
benefit regime to police the quality of transactions with private parties 
is not beneficial.  That task should be left to the private inurement 
regime. 
CONCLUSION 
Social enterprise legal reformers have been arguing for several 
years that there is an untapped potential for advancing the social good 
if only we could get the laws right.  Among other things, they have been 
arguing that significant social value could be created if we were to 
provide a clear legal mechanism for social enterprises to combine 
 
 182  Imagine in addition that the Earth Charity failed to require that the Cookstove 
Project require that its ethanol producers refrain from clear-cutting forests to produce 
its ethanol, and that ethanol produced from clear-cutting is worse from a global-
warming perspective than charcoal production. 
 183  In In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1084 (2006), John D. Colombo 
writes: 
If a charity enters into an economic transaction with someone who has 
no influence over the charity, there is simply no reason to believe that 
the charity would intentionally hand assets over to that person for less 
than full value . . . . [T]he notion that one would intentionally overpay 
or undercharge for services outside a context in which the recipient of 
the economic benefit has some kind of insider connection does not 
comport with either basic assumptions of our tax system nor with normal 
human economic behavior. 
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social investors or donors and profit-driven investors in a single entity.  
These reformers want laws to facilitate the creation of tranched social 
enterprises that have a subsidizing tranche of charitable funds.  I 
remain somewhat skeptical about the magnitude of the social benefit 
that could arise from legal reforms that facilitate this type of tranched 
investing in social enterprises, but I am convinced that the laws should 
facilitate experimentation and innovation when possible. 
If experimentation has the possibility of bringing social value 
(whether great or incremental), then it is worthwhile to clarify the 
legal restrictions are necessary to preserve the value created by the 
current regulatory regime, and which are extraneous.  Most social 
enterprise legal reformers (although not all) agree that it is important 
to preserve the private inurement regime, even when they do not 
elaborate on how the rule operates in the context of tranched social 
enterprises.184  I have argued that the private inurement regime is 
indeed justified and that its application to social enterprises should be 
clarified and strengthened.  The IRS should promulgate guidance 
making clear that a subsidizing tranche in a social enterprise 
presumptively creates an excess benefit for participants in the 
subsidized tranche, and so disqualified persons should not be investors 
in the subsidized tranche.  The enforcement of this rule would 
preserve the reasonable expectations of donors to charitable entities 
and the government, and as an additional bonus, provides a potentially 
important signaling function that could be used by tranched social 
enterprises seeking to bind themselves to credible commitments with 
regard to social goals. 
On the other hand, an expansive reading of the private benefit 
regime is less well justified.  The lack of certainty it creates means that 
it cannot enforce the reasonable expectations of the charitable donors 
or the government and cannot provide a signaling function to 
potential social investors outside of the charitable context.  Even if the 
private benefit regime were clarified, however, it would still not be 
justified if its clarification involved taking an expansive view of what it 
prohibited.  This is because a private benefit doctrine that requires all 
tranched social enterprises be controlled by charities or that permits 
the IRS to substitute its own discretion about excessive benefits in the 
social enterprise context is simply too restrictive.  The risks involved in 
 
 184  For example, Susannah Camic Tahk acknowledges that the “elaborate rules 
aimed at preventing nonprofits from misusing public subsidies” are important, and 
that, therefore, “Congress and/or the IRS can design measures intended to stimulate 
cross-sector collaborations so that those measures also minimize abusive transactions.”  
Tahk, supra note 2, at 539–40. 
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being overruled or second-guessed by the IRS would plausibly prevent 
the board from making decisions that maximized social welfare, and 
the result would be for social enterprises to choose entity structures 
that avoided tax-exempt investors, in order to avoid the legal 
constraints on those investors.  The result would be to remove from 
social investors the option of free-riding on the higher quality 
decisions of charities bound by the no-inurement rule.  Thus, the IRS 
should issue guidance properly cabining the private benefit doctrine. 
The difference between private inurement and private benefit is 
about the regimes’ relation to “independence.”  Under the private 
inurement rule, we trust independent directors to act in the best 
interests of the charity they oversee.  We provide regulatory oversight 
only when those directors’ independence is compromised.  Under the 
private benefit rule, we provide regulatory oversight regardless of the 
role of an independent board.  Thus, the private inurement regime 
relies on a certain “logic of independence” that is ignored by the 
private benefit regime.  If we can trust the logic of independence to 
prevent abusive transfers of charitable dollars, then we can have bright-
line rules in this area: no subsidizing investment of charitable dollars 
in a joint venture with disqualified persons.  If we cannot, then, this 
leaves us with ambiguity, and ambiguity will prevent many transactions 
from occurring (or, will force them to occur completely outside of the 
reach of non-profit law, in which case private inurement is permitted).  
The ultimate question is how much work “independence” can do. 
While the question of how much work “independence” can do in 
the regulation of social enterprises is ultimately beyond the scope of 
this Article, I suggest that the social enterprise field is an ideal place to 
begin experimentation on that very question.  If we were to clarify the 
law so it was clear how the private inurement regime applied to 
tranched social enterprises (strongly) and how the private benefit 
regime applied (weakly), we would empower social enterprises to opt 
in or out of these two regimes by choosing whether to seek investments 
from charitable sources.  Without providing unnecessary barriers to 
innovative structuring arrangement, we would empower a new 
generation of social entrepreneurs to solve the world’s problems. 
*  * * 
 
